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THE PATENTING OF THE LIBERAL
PROFESSIONS
JOHN R. THOMAS*
The regime of patents has traditionally been nothing if not hum-
ble. Its plodding acquisition procedures and formal enforcement an-
alyses historically confined themselves to the artifacts of the Industrial
Revolution and their immediate successors. The painstakingly cata-
logued Patent Office' classification scheme betrayed the sense, shared
if not easily articulated by the patent bar, of the sorts of inventions that
could be the subject of a patent and those that could not.'
Times have changed in patent law, Inventors from diverse disci-
plines, animated by a lenient judiciary and elevated to proprietors by
the Patent Office, have offered the patent system a bold new vision.
The sheer range of recently issued patents suggests that few restraints
hound the sorts of subject matter that may be appropriated via the
patent system. As we read with amusement patent instruments claiming
methods for swinging a golf club," treating cancer' or administering a
mortgage,' we come to realize that the patent law seems poised to
embrace the broadest reaches of human experience.
* Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University. The author gratefully acknow-
ledges the receipt of a uTiting grant from Oracle Corporation. The many thoughtful remarks of
participants in the Symposium on Intellect oaf Property Rights in Methods of Doing Rusitless, and
in particular those. of Joseph Rolla, Pamela Sanntelson, Richard Stern and Allen Wagner, contrib-
uted greatly to this Article. Thanks are also owed to the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and
the Institute of Intellectual Property of Tokyo, Japan, for their support d ari ng the drafting of this
Article, and to Marty Adelman, Rochelle Dreyfuss and Mark 1.Anuley for their helpful conmsents
on earlier dt-afts. Steven Kameny provided capable research assistance that is very t ouch appre-
ciated.
1 'the United States Patent and Trademark Office is the proper designation for this office.
See 35 U.S.C. 4 1 (1994).
2 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, EXAMINER HANDBOOK '11) THE U.S. PATENT
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM (1998), available al <littp:/ hewivItspio.gov/web/offices/pacidal,p/
sir/co/examhbk/index.html> ("The U.S. Patent Classification system provides for the storage
and retrimd of every patent document that a patent examiner heeds to review whet( examining
]:tent applications. Therefiwe, in the aggregate, the system must he exhaustive of all patentable
subject matter under patent laws.").
"Method of putting," U.S. Patent No, 5,616,089.
4 'Drugs and methods for treating diseases," U.S. Patent No. 5,456,663.
5 "System and method for implementing and administering a mortgage plan," U.S. Patent
No. 4,876,648.
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The recent opinion in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc.' suggests that the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit will pass an approving glance upon much of
this Patent Office work product, if called upon to do so. -' In State Street,
the plaintiff held a patent for a data processing system consisting of
software for managing a stock mutual funds The Federal Circuit not
only held that data transformation through a series of mathematical
calculations presented patentable technique, but also took the oppor-
tunity to obliterate the venerable proscription on patenting so-called
"methods of doing business." 9 Keenly aware of the State Street holding,
applicants have besieged the Patent Office with applications ranging
from financial software to Internet-based bushtess models. [['
State Street presents the latest in a series of cases testing the bound-
aries of the "useful Arts," the constitutional expression of subject mat-
ter appropriate for patenting." Embodying the current understanding
of this term to mean the "technological arts,"'' the patent statute
further refined patentable subject matter to include processes, ma-
chines, manufactures and compositions of matter.'s The first of these
terms appears the most troubling, particularly in light of its circular
6 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), red. denied, 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, created by the Federal Courts
improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 101, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified in various
sections of 28 U.S.C.), possesses exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent acquisition and
infringement cases.
8 See 149 F.3(1 at 1370,
9 See id. at 1375.
Seejonat Ilan Birk, Adapting- Piaress Patents to Cyberspace, NX. Lj., Nov. 10, 1098, at 1; Carol
B. Oberilorfer, Patents: 'Boom' in Business ∎Ilethod Patent Filings Ilan Followed 'State Sheer Ruling,
PTO Says, Trademark & Copyright Daily (RNA), No. 57, at 115 (Dec. 10, 1908) (reporting PTO
Deputy Commissioner Dickinson's prediction that the office will issue approximately 300 business
method patents in 1999) [hereinafter 'Boom' in Thisine.ss Jillethod Filingsj; Mark Walsh, Internet
Companies Seek Protection: Apply
 For Patents to Guard Technology. But Litigation May Slow Com-
merce, CRAIN's N.Y. Bus., Dec. 21, 1998, at 3.
II See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el, 8. This provision provides both for copyright legislation to
promote the development of "Science" by "Authors," as well as for patent legislation to promote
the development of the "useful Arts" by "Inventors." See In re Bulgy, 596 F.2(1 952, 958 (C.C.P.A.
1979), aff'd sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1080) ("the constitutionally-stated
purpose of granting patent lights to inventors for their discoveries is the promotion of progress
in the 'useful Arts,' ratlier than in science.").
IS See Pallid,: v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The exclusive light, constitu-
tionally derived, svas for the national purpose of advancing the useful arts—the process today
called technological innovation."); In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 007, 1003 (C.C,P.A. 1972) (Rich, J.,
concurring) ("The phrase 'technological arts.' as we have used it, is synonymous with the phrase
'useful arts' as it appears in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution."); see generally In re Nhisgrave,
431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
13 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (section entitled "Inventions patentable").
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statutory definition as a "process, art or method:" For without more,
the scope of the statutory term "process" appears co-extensive with
nearly any possible endeavor, as almost any imaginable function can
be articulated in a series of steps in the fashion of a patent instrument. 15
Determining the appropriate subject matter for patenting is im-
portant because a paucity of constraining doctrines allay the proprie-
tary rights associated with granted patents. 16 The adjudicated infringer -
need not have derived the patented invention from the patentee, as
liability rests solely upon a comparison of the text of the patent instru-
ment with an accused infringement.' 7 Patent law also lacks a robust
experimental use exemption In the nature of copyright law's fair use
priNilege. 18 Likewise, the doctrine of patent misuse has been reduced
to a withered remnant of its once hale self.'" The decision to subject
particular areas of endeavor to the patent system is therefore of great
moment, in effect subjecting entire industries to a private regulatory
envirotiment with constantly shifting contours. Given the contempo-
rary movement towards an increasingly ambitious sense of patentable
subject matter, further reflection upon the appropriate grasp of the
patent system appears worthwhile.
This Article takes as its focus patentable processes and, in particu-
lar, the business methods addressed in State Street. Part I of this Article
briefly reviews the history of process patents, from early case law under
the Statute of Monopolies to the recent debates regarding computer-
implemented mathematical algorithms. It then traces the rise of pat-
ents on computerized business models and their confirmation in State
Street. Casting a critical eye towards that opinion, Part I concludes that
the patent eligibility inquiry has been reduced to one of mere utility.
This trend is a disturbing one, for unlike breakthroughs in computer
or biotechnologies, business methods are vastly older than the patent
system itself. Yet only recently have we come to understand that such
techniques lie within the reach of the patent system.
14 See it!. § 100(h).
15 See Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Prolectirm for Albrorithms
and Other Computer Program -Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1033-34 (1990) (tirging tliat
the extent of patentable subject tinnier should tun he understood to overlap with the ordinary,
and exceptionally broad, me:toting of the term "process").
16 The patentee of all invention has the exclusive right to make, use, sell, offer to sell or
in port into the United States the patented invention. See 35 U.S.C., 271(a) (1994).
17 See MAirrtN,I. AIDELmAN er AL., PATENT LASS' 860-61 (1998).
18 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experi-
mental Use, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1017, 1023 (1989); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rig/its and
the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE Lj, 177, 222 (1987).
19 See generally Note, Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, 110 limo% L. REA'. 1922 (1997);
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In Part II, this Article explores the broad ramifications of the State
Street opinion. The Patent Office's willingness to consider business
method applications means that fewer constraints bar the grant of
patents on other utilitarian processes. Disconnected from any physical
apparatus, such patents will set forth not so much technical artifacts,
but a broad category of proprietary modes of analysis, techniques and
protocols from disciplines ranging from the social sciences to the law.
Yet surely the constitutional directive that patents apply to the "useful
Arts," as well as our long-held sense . of the reach of the patent system,
must somehow cabin the extent of patentable subject matter. We have
come to this place, this Article reasons, because of our near-total
engagement with the artificial. Identifying the ontic dimension of
technology has perplexed not only the courts, but epistemologists and
the most accomplished of technological observers as well.
Resolving to develop an articulation of those aspects of human
endeavor we may fairly call technological, Part II invokes contempo-
rary thought about technology. Turning to the technological commen-
tary of Robert McGinn,. Paul W. DeVore and - Carl Mitcham, this Article
develops a typology of traits that distinguish technology from other
forms of human activity. This Article concludes that technological
activities are concerned with the production or transformation of arti-
facts through the systematic manipulation of physical forces. Bounded
by interaction with the external environment, technological activities
expend resources and knowledge in order to fabricate or modify prod-
ucts, or to develop procedural systems for so doing. Furthermore,
technology presents a form of rational and systematic knowledge, ori-
ented towards efficiency and capable of being assessed through objec-
tive criteria.
This Article continues in Part III by considering how we can move
from a catalogue of characteristics to an essentialist, legally apt defini-
tion of the technological. Recent experience concerning methods of
medical treatment suggests one technique: amendment of the Patent
Act to create particularized patent-free spheres of activity. This Article
concludes that clue to the obligations of the TRIPS Agreement, the
intellectual property component of the World Trade Organization
treaty, such efforts are unlikely to succeed. 2° Given the TRIPS Agree-
Mark A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic Irrationality of flue Patent Misuse Dochine, 78 CAI,. L.
REv. 1599 (1090).
20 See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
1NSTRUNIENTS—RESUI.TS OF TDE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 331.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement].
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meat mandate that patent rights be enjoyable without discrimination
as to the field of technology, even the recent amendment concerning
medical methods appears stispect. 2 i
This Article finds a more favorable solution in the standard of
industrial application. Long a part of many foreign laws and fully
compatible with the TRIPS Agreement, the standards developed under
the industrial application requirement bear a striking resemblance to
contemporary thought about the scope of technological activities. By
restricting patentable advances to the repeatable production or trans-
formation of material objects and excluding subject matter founded
upon the aesthetic, social observation or personal skill, the industrial
application requirement would restore a sense of patentable subject
matter that matches our sensibilities.
I. THE PATENT ELIGIBILITY OF BUSINESS METHODS
A. The Foundational Law of Business Methods
From its very beginnings, the patent system has struggled with
the patentability of methods. The forbearer of contemporary patent
legislation, the English Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 22 extended the
possibility of patenting only to "manufactures." 23 Although the usual
sense of that term suggests human-made artifacts, the rationalization
of production techniques brought about by the Industrial Revolution
led courts to entertain a widening conception of patentable subject
matter. By the mid-nineteenth century, the English patent system had
extended fully to both products and processes. 24 Yet, discomfort with
the potential scope of process protection remains today. Common-
wealth courts that continued to interpret the term "manufactures"
sought to limit the patent system to so-called "manual arts," 25 "ar-
tificially created state of affairs "26 or the production or preservation of
vendible products. 27
21 See TRIPS Agreement § 5, art. 27(1).
22 See 21 jam. I. ch. 3 (1624); we generally Chris R. Kyle. Bra a New Button to an Old Coat:
77w Enactment of Me Statute of Alotropolies, 19 . 1. LEGAL Ihs-r. 203 (1998).
23 The Statute prohihiteilihe CrOl•il from granting monopolies excel)! "to the true and first
Inventor and Inventors" of "ant' manner of new Manufacture wiihin this Realme ....” 21 jam.
I, ch. 3, § 6.
"See Crane v. Price, 154 Eng. Rep. 239, 248 (1842) (per curium).
25 Maeder v. Busch, (1938) 50 C.L.R. 684, 006.
26 National ReSeaFdi !Icy. Corp. v. Commissioner of Patents (1950) 102 C.L.R. 252, 277.
27 11oulton v. B1111, 126 Eng. Rep. 651, 661 (1795).
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Seemingly aware of the English experience, the United States
Congress expressly declared a "useful Art" to be within the scope of
the 1790 Patent Act. 28
 Section 101 of the current legislation, the Patent
Act of 1952, extends patentability to "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. " 29 The statute circu-
larly defines the term "process" to mean any "process, art or method,"
including "a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter or material."• United States Supreme Court
elaborations of this definition have included "a method of doing a
thing,"3 ' "a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given
result"32
 and "some practicable method or means of producing a bene-
ficial result or effect.""
Although United Suites courts possessed a firmer statutory basis
for processes than their common law peers, they too experienced
difficulties in adjudicating disputes involving process patents. 34
 Pat-
ented processes are often practiced in secret, with only the product of
the process available to the public. The inchoate nature of processes
makes it difficult to evaluate their impact upon the public domain,"
assess whether they have been infringed" and determine how they can
be physically marked.37
But particularly troubling within the sphere of processes is the
demarcation of the limits of patentable subject matter. Seemingly any
sort of communicable technique can be articulated as a series of steps
and expressed in the style of a patent claim." This sense is reinforced
28 See U.S. CoIsisT, art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress "No promote the Progress of
ScieilCe and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
2J35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
35 1d, §100(b).
31 Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366, 383 (1909).
32 Cochrane v. Deeper, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1877).
"'Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 Ho•.) 252, '268 (1853).
' 34 See Donald S. Chisum, The Future of Software Protection: The Patentability of Algorithms, 47
U. Purr. L. REV. 959, 963 (1986) (noting the problems encountered ill interpreting the meaning
of "process"). Earlier treatments call he found ill Herman Berinan,411ethud Claims, 17 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc.'s . 713, 719 (1935); see generally William B. Whitney, Patentable Processes, 19 HARv. L. REV. 30
(1905).
33 See, e.g., Metallizing F.ng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts, 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946).
36 See Process Patents Amendment Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 9001-9007, 102 Stat.
1107 (codified in various sections of 35 U.S.C.). See generally Eli Lilly Co. v. At nerican Cyanamid
Co., 82 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996); W. Bradley Haymond, The Process Patent Amendments Act of
1988: Solving An Obi Problem, But Creating New Ones, 1989 MU L. Rev. 507: Glenn E.J. Murphy,
Note, The Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988, 9 J.L• & Com. 207 (1989).
37 See, e.g., American Med. Sys., Inc. v. Medical Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
38 See Samuelson, supra note 15, at 1033.
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by the legislative history of the current patent statute, which the Su-
preme Court read as holding "that Congress intended statutory subject
matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man.'"" 9
Perhaps realizing the expansive grasp of proprietarization made
possible by the patent system, the courts developed a number of doc-
trines to cabin its reach. Variously expressed as bars to patents on
business methods,4" as well as such things as "mental steps," "algo-
rithms" and "printed matter," these doctrines purported to hold cer-
tain subject matter unpatentable per se. 4 ' Chief among these limitations
was the longstanding sentiment that "[a]11 idea of itself is not patent-
able."42 "While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it,
is not patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with
the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be."43 Although the policy
undelpinnings of this restriction were never articulated well, the Su-
preme Court once suggested that such abstractions comprised "the
basic tools of scientific and technological work," 41 too central' to the
process of technological development to be appropriable. Just as the
copyright law limits itself to protection of expression and permits an
author's ideas to enrich the public domain, 45 so too did the patent law
concern the physical instantiation of technological knowledge rather
than that knowledge itself.
The bar against patenting business methods represented an ex-
tension of the proscription on patenting abstract principles. As early
as 1869, the Patent. Commissioner sensed that "bit is contrary to the
spirit of the law . . . to grant patents for methods of book-keeping." 4 °
v. Diehl ., 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1070, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess., 5 (1052); H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d SCSS., 0 (1052)). But see DONALD S. CIIISUM,
PATENTS: A TREATISE ON TILE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 1.01, at 1-6
(1999) (•Theoretical or abstract discoveries are exchnled as ale discoveries, however practical
and useful, in non-technological arts, such as the liberal arts, the social sciences, !hermetical
matheinaties, and business and management methodology,"); Giles S, Rlcll, Princip4s of Patenta-
bility, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REY. 303, 393-94 (1960) ("Of course, not every kind of an invention can
be patented. Invaluable though it may be to individuals, the public, and uarional defense, the
invention of a more effective organization of the materials ill, mid the techniques of teaching a
course hi ph)'sics, chemisiry, or Russian is not a patentable iiivention ....Also outside that group
is one of the greatest invention's of pm- times, the diaper service.")
"See generally Gm). E. 'Few, Method of Doing Business, 16 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 607 (1934); E.
Robert Voches & Howard G. Pollack, Is the "Method of Doing Business" Rejection Bankrupt?, 3 FED.
CIR. R.J. 73 (1993).
. 11 See Chisum, supra noie 34, at 964-71.
42. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. s'. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874).
43 Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1930).
4'1
	 v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
45 Sec 17 U.S.C. § 102(h) (1994).
4° Ex Barre Abraham. 1869 Dec, Coinui'r Pat  r0 50
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Nineteenth century courts also opined that "a method of transacting
common business"47 or "a mere contract"48 were unpatentable. Yet it
was not until the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit's 1908 opinion in Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co. 49
that the proscription on business method patents was secured ht the
treatises.'')
The patent at issue in Hotel Security Checkingconcerned a "method
of and means for cash-registering and account-checking" designed to
prevent fraud by waiters and cashiers.''' The system employed certain
forms that tracked sales and ensured that waiters submitted appropri-
ate funds at the close of business." The Second Circuit invalidated the
patent on the basis of prior knowledge, finding that the patented
technology "would occur to anyone conversant with the business." 5"
However, the court further observed that:
It is manifest that the subject-matter of the claims is not a
machine, manufacture or composition of matter. If within the
language of the statute at all, it must be as a "new and useful
art." One of the definitions given by Webster of the word "art"
is as follows: "The employment of means to accomplish some
desired end; the adaptation of things in the natural world to
the uses of life; the application of knowledge or power to
practical purposes." In the sense of the patent law, an art is
not a mere abstraction. A system of transacting business dis-
connected from the means for carrying out the system is not,
within the most liberal interpretation of the term, an art. 54
Similarly, in 1894, in Ex parte Thrum; the Commissioner of the
Patent and Trademark Office stated that "a plan or theory of action
which, if carried into practice, could produce no physical results pro-
ceeding directly from the operation of the theory or plan itself is
not an art within the meaning of the patent laws." 55 Thus, both courts
47
 United States Credit Sys. Co. v. /kinetic:ill Credit Indem. Co., 53 F. 818, 819 (S.D.N.V. 1803),
48 In re Moese•, 27 App. D.C. 307, 310 (1900).
48 100 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908).
58 See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v, Signature Fin. Group, Inc„ 149 F,3(1 1308, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999) (noting that Hole/ Security Checking is use case
frequently' cited as establishing the business theiluxl exception to statutory subject matter");
Rinaldo Del Gallo, III, Are "Methods of Doing Business" Finally Out of Business as a Statutory
Rejection?, 38 IDEA 403, 405 (1998).
51 See 160 F. at 407.
52 See id. at 467-68.
55 See id. at 471.
54 Id. at 409,
55 1894 Dec. Connu'r Pat. 36, 38.
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and the Patent Office hinged the patentability of processes upon the
presence of a "physical tangible facility" for practicing the patented
technique.''' Importantly, both tribunals also held that mere "printed
matter"—information inscribed upon a substrate for purposes of pres-
entation—would not suffice to fulfill the requirement. 57 Only physical
structures exhibiting a functional relationship between the substrate
and written material would enter the realm of the patentable."
Numerous decisions applied this standard while denying patents
on business-oriented inventions. Citing a lack of physical structure
other than printed matter, the courts struck down patents claiming a
method for transferring writings from manuscript form to printed
publication form, 59 a system of blank checks and stubs useful in a
combined checking/savings acconnt° and a system for national coor-
dination of firefighting efforts.''' Some patents were upheld. For exam-
ple, a railway ticket consisting of a base and separable attachment was
held not to "relat[e] merely to a 'Method of transacting business,"' but
to involve a unique physical structure.62
The requirement of physical instantiation is not an illogical one.
It ties the relatively abstract proprietary interests created by patent law
to the corporeal things that form the traditional objects of property.
The identifiable boundaries that result better enable individuals to
complete transactions, form markets and determine the sorts of con-
duct that will be judged permissible. The stricture that processes gen-
erate tangible results also places appropriate limits upon infringement
liability, for the .courts may far more readily observe the market impact
of manipulated objects than trace the effect of more rarefied teachings.
In all of these matters, patent law reflects the precepts of the copyright
law, which offers protection only to works fixed in a tangible medium
of expression."
56 See Rand, McNally K Co. v. Exchange Scrip-Book co., 187 F. 984, 986 (7th Cir. 1911).
57 See, e.g. Th•ner, 1894 Dec. Collin''' . Pat. 36, 38.	 •
58 See In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1398 (C,C,P.A. 1959); In re Jones, 373 F.2d 1007, 1012
(C.C.P.A. 1967); see generally Morton C. Jacoh, Note, The Patentability of Printed Matter: Critique
and Proposal, 18 Gr.°. WAsii. L. REV. 475 (1950).
59 See generally In c• Bololigaro, 02 F.2d 1059 (C.C.P.A. 1933).
6" See generally in re Sterling, 70 F.2d 910 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
61 See generally In re Patton, 127 F.2d 324 '(C.C.P.A. 1942).
62 Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Pope, 210 F. 443, 440 (0th Cir, 1913).
65 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (1994). See also Wendy" Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits
of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1343, 1380-82 (1989)..
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B. Computer-Implemented Methods
The demand for physical structure proved a serviceable patent
eligibility standard for most of the history of the patent system. The
use of computer technology sorely tested this familiar principle, how-
ever. Applicants in the computer arts urged that electronic circuits and
the software to command them were as industrial in character as more
traditional technologies. Patent examiners initially cast an extremely
wary eye on these applications. The examiners recognized that much
of the precedent exempting abstract ideas from the patent system
would be swept away if patents were issued for computers programmed
to perform newly invented mathematical algorithms."
The Supreme Court entered the debate when it granted certiorari
in Gottschalk v. Benson in 1972.65 In Benson, the applicant claimed a
method of converting numerals from binary-coded decimal to pure
binary format. 66
 The steps of the method comprised mathematical
operations that shuffled a sequence of bits in order to express appro-
priately a particular number. 67
 The application claimed this method
as performed by a computer." But the application also claimed the
method more abstractly without reference to a particular physical
means.69
 The method bad broad application in data processing tasks,
ranging from "the operation of a train to verification of drivers' li-
censes to researching the law books" in the words of the Court. 7°
In a cryptic opinion, the Court upheld the Patent Office's rejec-
tion of the application. 71
 The Court first recited the traditional require-
ment that patentability hinged upon the "Nransformation and reduc-
64
 The bookshelves groan tinder the weight of numerous articles discussing the early inter-
action between computer technologies and the patent system, as well as the subsequent debate
over the patenting of computer-related inventions. For more recent publications on this topic,
see Stephen G. Kunin, Patentability of Computer Related Inventions in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc ' v 833 (1995); Pamela Samuelson at al., A
Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994);
Brian Richard Yoshida, Claiming Electronic and Software Technologies: The Effect of the Federal
Circuit Decisions in Alappat, Warmerdant, and Lowry on the Claiming of Mathematical Algorithms
and Data Structures, 45 BUFF'. L. REV. 457 (1997); Maximilian R. Peterson, Note, Now You See It,
Now You Don't: Ms It a Patentable Machine or an Unpatentable 'Algorithm"? On Principle and
Expedient' in Current Patent Law Doctrines Relating to Computer-Implemented Inventions, 64 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 90 (1995).
65 400 U.S. 63 (1972).
66 See id. at 65.
67 See id. at 65-67.
68 See id. at 65.
6• See id. at 68.
76 Benson, 409 U.S. at 68.
71 See id. at 73.
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don of an article 'to a different state or thing." 72 Arguably, at least
those claims reciting computer implementation of the numerical con-
version method did involve some sort of physical conversion." Opera-
tion of the computer would not only manipulate those electrical signals
representing the data, but would also generate electrical signals in
order to instruct the computer to perform certain tasks. 74 Yet the Court
found this hardware insufficient, drawing its analysis to a close with a
self-styled "nutshell":
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in prac-
tical effect that would be the result if the formula for convert-
ing BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were patented
. . . . The mathematical formula involved here has no sub-
stantial practical application except in connection with a digi-
tal computer, which means that if the judgment below is
affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical
formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the
algorithm itself. 75
Thus, the Court held that computerization of mathematical equa-
tions could not shift them from the realm of ideas to that of indus-
try." Internal circuitry operations were not enough to uphold even
those claims requiring computer hardware, for barring the pres-
ence of an idiot savant or enormous mechanical computer to per-
form the claimed conversions rapidly, a digital computer presented
the only context' in which the equations might have meaning."
Nevertheless, the Court held that the digital computer amounted
only to "nominal hardware" that placed no meaningful limitations
upon the scope of the claims."
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had numerous oppor-
tunities to follow the lead of the Supreme Court. In In re Matamps,
the applicant claimed a "computing system for processing data" that
determined the optimum number of sales representatives for a given
organization as well as the number of times they should visit customers
over a period of time.'" The invention consisted of various formulae
72 1d. at 70.
73 See id. at 65.
74 See id.
75 Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
78 See id.
77 See id.
78 See Richard II. Stern, Tales from the Akwithin War: Henson to lwakaski, It's Ihja Ytt All
Over Again, 18 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Ass' N Qi. 371, 382 (1991).
See 609 F.2d 481, 482 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
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that Maucorps had derived from sales experience and implemented
via software written in the Fortran programming language. 8° The court
affirmed the rejection of the application, reasoning that the "claimed
invention as a whole comprise [d] each and every means for carrying
out a solution technique for a set of equations wherein one number is
computed from a set of numbers."8 '
In re Meyer was-decided using analagous reasoning. 82 Meyer's ap-
plication described a computer-based expert system for aiding a neu-
rologist in diagnosing patients.'" His claims were drafted broadly, call-
ing for a more generalized "process for indentifying [sic] locations of
probable malfunction in a complex system."84 lti essence, Meyer called
for test data to he accumulated and for conclusions to be reached in
accordance with statistical fo•mulae.85 The court again affirmed the
rejection of the application, quoting with approval the Patent Office's
conclusion that the "process recited is an attempt to patent a mathe-
matical algorithm rather than a process for producing a product." 8°
This early resistance to patents on computer-related inventions
faded over time. By the early 1980s, Patent Office examiners found
more favor in computer-related inventions and courts seemed more
willing to uphold the issued patents. 81 Although one might be tempted
to see this willingness as a response to the increasingly important role
that computer technology played in the United States economy, it is
likely that both the Patent Office and the courts grew weary of the
relentless argumentation of a bar that had scant motivation to favor
restraints upon the scope of patenting. Also influential was the 1980
opinion in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 88 a Supreme Court decision that
opened the patent system to biotechnology.
Chakrabarty involved the Patent Office's rejection of an applica-
tion claiming an artificially generated microorganism. 8° The Patent
Office Solicitor argued to the Supreme Court that the resolution of
the patentability of inventions involving genetic technology should be-
left to Congress because genetic technology could not have been fore-
"See id. 482-83.
81 Id. at 486.
"See 688 F.2d 789,794 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
"See id. at 790-92.
84 See id. at 793.
"See id. at 791-92.
"See id. at 794.
87 See, e.g., In re Deutsch, 553 .F.2d 689,693 (C.C.P.A. 1977): In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152,
159 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
88 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
"See id. at 305-06.
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seen at the time the patent statute was drafted:A En route to reversing
the Patent Office decision, the Court disagreed: "A rule that unantici-
pated inventions are without protection would conflict with the core
concept of the patent law that anticipation undermines pate ► tability.'•
The difficulty with this reasoning is that it mixes two logical classes:
individual technologies are mixed with the entire domain of invention.
As illustrated by Bertrand Russell in his famous debate with Father
Copleston, the fact that every person has a mother does not lead to
the conclusion that the human race as a whole must have a moiher. 92
As well, that the patent statute in part judges patentability through an
anticipation standard hardly suggests that we lack other governing
principles of patent eligibility.
Despite this lapse in the reasoning in Chahrabarly, the Supreme
Court leaned- heavily on this decision in its 1981 opinion in Diamond
Dieht" In Dieter, the applicants claimed a process for operating a
rubber-► olding press with the aid of a digital computer. 94 Their com-
puter continuously monitored the temperature inside a press and
employed the well-known Arrhenius equation to calculate the amount
of time required to cure the rubber. 95 When the elapsed time equaled
the actual molding time, the computer signaled a device to open the
press.'"'
At the Patent Office, the examiner determined that the process
steps implemented in the computer software were non-statutory in
nature.° The examiner further reasoned that the "remaining steps—
installing rubber in the press and the subsequent closing of the press—
were 'conventional and necessary to the process and [could not] be
the basis of patentability.'"98 On appeal, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals reversed.•• Following a grant of certiorari, the Supreme
Court affirmed.'w Relying upon Chaltrabarty, the Court explained that
the applicants:
• 98 See id. at 314-15.
91 Id. at 316.
92 See Bertrand Russell & F.C. Coplesion, A Debate on the Existence of God, in BERTRAND
RUSSELL ON GOD AND RELIGION 123, 131 (Al Seek! ed., 1986).
"450 U.S. 175 (1981).
°I See id. at 177.
95 See id. at 178-79.
9fi See id. at 177-78.
97 See id. at 179-80.
98 Dirk', 450 U.S. at 180-81.
"See In re Diehr, 602 17.2(1 982 (1979).
109 IMO; 450 U.S. at 177, 192-93.
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do not seek to patent a mathematical formula. Instead, they
seek patent protection for a process of curing synthetic nib-
her. Their process admittedly employs a well-known mathe-
matical equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt the use of
that equation. Rather, they seek only to foreclose from others
the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the other
steps in their claimed process. 1 °'
A number of difficulties attend the Diehr court's analysis. The
advancement offered by the Diehrapplicants consisted of mathematical
computations. The physical steps on which so much depended—read-
ing a thermometer and signaling a press door to open—were routine.
That patentability should be permitted to turn on the inclusion in the
claims of such routine steps seems unwarranted, as the Diehr applicants
merely stated the only technical context in which the mathematics
would operate. The steps did not present meaningful limitations upon
the scope of the claims. To the extent that the prohibition against
patenting ideas presents sound policy, allowing applicants to avoid
these limitations through artful claim drafting appears unwise.
The patent bar nonetheless proved attentive to the lessons of
Diehr. Technologists proved increasingly adept at claiming newly for-
mulated mathematical equations alongside some sort of physical mani-
festation. In response, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
formed the two-part Freeman-Waller-Abele test. The court originally ar-
ticulated this test in 1978 in In re Freeman,'°2 and later refined the test
in 1980 in In re Walter)" Following the Supreme Court's issuance of
its Diehr decision,ifil the court further modified the standard in 1982
in In re Abele.' °5
 As later described by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit:
It is first determined whether a mathematical algorithm is
recited directly or indirectly in the claim. If so, it is next
determined whether the claimed invention as a whole is no
more than the algorithm itself; that is, whether the claim is
directed to a mathematical algorithm that is not applied to
or limited by physical elements or process steps. Such claims
are nonstatutory. However, when the mathematical algorithm
1 ° 1 Id. at 187.
102 See 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
I°3 See 618 Eat 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
104 See supra notes 93-101 and accontpattOng text.
105 See 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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is applied in one or more steps of an otherwise statutory
process claim, or one or more elements of an otherwise
statutory apparatus claim, the requirements of section 101 are
inet. 106
The Federal Circuit employed the Freeman -Walter-Abele test both to
rejectim and allow" various applications as patentable subject mat-
ter. But its decisionS demonstrated an increasingly permissive tenor,
and a glance through the Patent Office Gazette showed a growing
number of issued patents directed towards computer-related inven-
tions.
Emboldened by the growing acquiescence of the courts and the
Patent Office,' 09 applicants eventually abandoned even the pretext of
tying the mathematics to a traditionally industrial process such as
curing rubber. Rather, the tangible thing upon which patentability was
keyed was the combination of a computer and the software-driven
electrical signals employed to instruct it. Because general purpose
computers could be conceived as special purpose computers once
instructed by software, virtually any fragment of software code could
be viewed as statutory subject matter!'"
Although this reasoning had been impliedly rejected in Benson, it
met with great success in the Federal Circuit's en Banc decision in In
re Alappat."' There, the court considered a claimed apparatus useful
for generating smooth and continuous lines for display on an oscillo-
scope. 112 Alappat's invention completed various mathematical compu-
tations in order to convert so-called "vector list data" into "pixel illu-
mination intensity data"; that is, it converted one set of numbers into
another set of numbers.'" The majority held that the claimed inven-
tion comprised statutory subject matter:
1 °°Arrtrythtnia Research Tech., Inc. V. Corazonix Corp., 958 F,2(1 1053, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1 °7 See In re Crams, 888 F.2d 835, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
1 °8 See In re lwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
'0" See generally Arrhythmia, 058 F.2d 1053; Inwhashi, 888 F.2d 1370. But we generally Grams,
888 F.2d 835.
10 This argument had met with success in In w Berultart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1400 (C,,C.P.A.
1969). See also In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404 n.29 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
It' 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1904) (ett bane). See generally Sang 1.1 ui Michael Kiln, itt reAlappat:
A Strict Statutory Interpretation Determining Patentable Subject Matter Relating to Computer Soft-
ware?, 13 j. MAreatml. j. COMPUTER & INFO. L 635 (1995); W. War King, jr., The Soul of the
Virtual Machine: In re Mapput, 2 J. 1NrF:u.. Noe. L. 575 (1995); John A. !Walk, Comment,
Towarrls a Rational Jurisprudence of Computer-Related Patentability in Light of In re Alappal, 79
MINN. L. REv. 1129 (1995).
112 See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1537.
114 Id. at 1537-30.
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Although many, or arguably even all, of the means elements
recited in claim 15 represent circuitry elements that perform
mathematical calculations, which is essentially true of all digi-
tal electrical circuits, the claimed invention as a whole is
directed to a combination of interrelated elements which
combine to form a machine for converting discrete waveform
data samples into anti-aliased pixel illumination intensity data
to be displayed on a display means. This is not a disembodied
mathematical concept which may be characterized as an "ab-
stract idea," but rather a specific machine to produce a useful,
concrete, and tangible result. 11-I
The en hanc court also quickly distinguished Maucoips and Nleyer." 5
According to the court in A/appat, "Maumps dealt with a business
methodology for deciding how salesmen should best handle .. .
customers and Meyer involved a 'system' for aiding a neurologist in
diagnosing patients.""GThus, the Allapat court concluded that "nei-
ther of the alleged 'inventions' in those cases falls within any § 101
Category."" 7
Reconciling Alappal with Benson appears difficult. Both inventions
concerned data transformations performed by a computer using
mathematical calculations. Yet, according to the Federal Circuit, the
Benson Court had instead attempted to express the concept that "cer-
tain types of mathematical subject matter, standing alone, represent
nothing more than abstract ideas until reduced to some type of prac-
tical application, and thus that subject matter is not, in and of itself,
entitled to patent protection.""8 That the applicant in Benson could
have circumvented the Supreme Court's objection simply by naming
one practical application for his algorithm seems quite implausible,
particularly since the Court took pains to catalogue sonic of the many
uses of that algorithm in its opinion. 119
After A/appat, the long-running saga concerning the patentability
of computer-related inventions seemed of little more than historical
interest. Seemingly, any applicant who drafted patent claims within the
strictures of the vitiated physicality standard could obtain a patent on
ni Id. at 1544.
"5 See id. at 1541. See also ,Ilaumps, 609 F.2d at 481; ilkyer, 688 F.2d at 789; supra notes
79-86 and accompanying text.
II6 A/appat, 33 F.3d at 1541.
"7 Id.
at 1543.
"9 See supra notes 70 and accontpanying text.
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nearly any data-processing technique. That the advance was found
not in computer circuitry or programming techniques was beside the
point; so long as the technique could be performed by a computer and
was so characterized, then a patent could issue.
Given that many such techniques are only practically realizable
when performed on a computer, this minimal stricture was one many
applicants could live with. Yet few failed to realize that the artful claims
drafting inspired by Diehr and Alappat amounted to little more than a
charade. 120 Although a robust physical transformation requirement was
itself quite defensible, its hobbled remnant seemed only to encourage
contorted claims drafting."' Some jurists seemed willing to abandon
the requirement of physicality in favor of a more expansive vision of
patentability, as suggested by Judge Newman's view in a 1994 dissent
that:
[A] statutory "process" is limited only in that it must be
technologically useful... . . All mathematical algorithms trans-
form data, and thus serve as a process to convert initial
conditions or inputs into solutions or outputs, through trans-
formation of information.... The test is simply whether the
mathematical formula . . . is all that is claimed, or whether
the procedures involving the specified mathematics are part
of a useful process. When the latter requirement is met the
subject matter is statutory.' 22
Only four years would elapse before a view of statutory subject
matter that embraced the "transformation of information" would
make its way from the dissent to the majority. The Federal Circuit's
decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group,
Inc. marked the inevitable resolution of the conflict between the
venerable case law on business methods and more recent develop-
ments on computer-related inventions. 123
121) See Alappat, 33 F.34 at 1564 (Archer, dj., dissenting).
i 21 Sec generallyiolui R, Thomas, Of Text, Technique, and the Tangible: Drafting Patent Claims
Around Patent Pules, 17 J, MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 219 (1998).
122 In tr Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 207 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting),
123 See 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed, Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999). Also of note was the
district comt opinion in Paine, MAI; Jackson Co' Curtis, Inc. a, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner CI'
Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1364, 1369 (1). Del. 1983) (holding that Merrill Lynch's claimed
"system for processing aril supervising a plurality of" Composit e subscriber [investment 1 accounts"
comprised "statutory subject limiter because the claims allegedly teach a method of operation on
computer 10 effectuate a business activity."). Paine, 'Wet . is discussed in Samuelson, supra 'lute
15, at 1120-21.
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C. Computer-Implemented Business Methods
Signature Financial Group held the patent at suit in State StreetY24
Directed to a "Data Processing System for Hub and Spoke Financial
Services Configuration," it described a data-processing system for im-
plementing an investment structure known as a "Huh and Spoke"
system. 125
 This system allowed individual mutual funds ("Spokes") to
pool their assets in an investment portfolio ("Hub") organized as a
partnership.'''' According to the patent, this investment regime pro-
vided the advantageous combination of economies of scale in admin-
istering investments coupled with the tax advantages of a partner-
ship.' 27
Maintaining a proper accounting of this sophisticated financial
structure proved difficult. The complexity of the calculations made the
use of a computer a virtual necessity. 128 Signature's patented system
purported to allow administrators to monitor financial information
121 See 149 F.3d at 1370. See also "Data processing system for hub and spoke financial services
cotifigurmion," U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056. The first claim of the '056 patent provided:
I. A data processing system for managing a financial services configuration of a
portfolio established as a partnership, each partner being one of a plurality of funds,
comprising: (a) computer processor means for processing data; (b) storage mewls
for storing data on a siotage medium; (c) first means for initializing the storage
medium; (d) second means for processing data regarding assets in the portfolio
and each of lite flu ids from a previous day mill data regarding increases or decreases
in each of the finials, [sic] assets and for allocating the percentage slime that each
fund holds in the portfolio; (e) third means for processing data regarding daily
incremental income, expenses, and net realized gain or loss for the portfolio and
for allocating such data among each fund; (0 fourth means for processing data
regarding daily net unrealized gain or loss for the portfolio and for allocating such
data among each fund; and (g) fifth means for processing data regarding aggregate
year-cud income, expenses, and capital gain or loss for the portfolio and each of
the funds.
Interestingly, Signature's claim fails to recite how the various means elements interact with each
other, either functionally or structru-ally. See ADELMAN rr AL, SUM note 17, at 645 (noting this
familiar requirement of claims drafting). The claim appears to recite a !Hele aggregation not in
conformity with the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1904). See In re Worrest, 201 F.21 930,
934 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (defining an mtpatentable aggregation as "a device having two or more
unrelated, independent units or elements, each or which performs its fu nction separately, WI--
influenced by and indifferent to the action of the oilier units. There is no CSSCItlial or inherent
correlation, or cooperation, or coordination of elements which mutually contribute to a common
purpose or result, other than mere convenience due to juxtaposition or collection of the units
in a common setting.").
125 See Stale Street, 149 F.3d at 1370.
126
 See id.
127 See id.
128 See id. at 1371.
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and complete the necessary calculations.' 29 In addition, it tracked "all
the relevant data determined on a daily basis for the Hub and each
Spoke, so that aggregate year end income, expenses, and capital gain
or loss can be determined for accounting and tax purposes for the
Hub and, as a result, for each publicly traded Spoke."'" Crucially,
Signature's invention marked no advance in computer technology or
mathematical calculations. The basis for patentability was the unique- •
ness of the investment package Signature claimed in its patent."'
Following issuance of the patent, Signature entered into licensing
negotiations with a competitor, State Street Bank, that ultimately
proved unsuccessful."' State Street then brought a declaratory judg-
ment action against Signature, seeking the invalidity of the patent." 3
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of State Street
under two alternative grounds.'M First, the court applied the Freeman-
Walter-Abele test,'" concluding that:
At bottom, the invention is an accounting system for a certain
type of financial investment vehicle claimed as [a] means for
'performing a series of mathematical functions. Quite simply,
it involves no further physical transformation or reduction
than inputting numbers, calculating numbers, outputting
numbers, and storing numbers. The same functions could be
. performed, albeit less efficiently, by an accountant armed
with pencil, paper, calculator, and a filing system.'"
The court then buttressed its holding by turning to "the long-estab-
lished principle that business 'plans' and 'systems' are not patent-
able." 1 "7 The court judged that "patenting an accounting system
necessary to carry on a certain type of business is tantamount to a
patent on the business itself."'" Thus, because the court found that
"abstract ideas are not patentable, either as methods of doing busi-
ness or as mathematical algorithms," the patent was held to be
it 'valid.'"
12" See id.
I " Stale Sheri, 149 F.3(1 at 1371.
See U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056.
132 See 149 F.11 at 1370.
1" See State Street Bank & Trost Co. v. Sigtialttre Fin. Group, Inc., 027 F. Stipp. 502, 504 (D.
Mass. 1990).
I" See id. at 512-14.i.
us id. at 512-15.
156 1d. at 515.
1:47
13S Slate Shrei, 927 F. Stipp. at 516.
139 Id.
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit reversed in a magisterial opinion.'" Wilting for a three-judge
panel, Judge Rich found the patent claimed not an abstract idea but
a progrannned machine that produced a "useful, concrete, and tangi-
ble result."'" Because the invention achieved a useful result, it consti-
tuted patentable subject matter even though its result was expressed
numerically.'" According to the court, It] he question of whether a
claim encompasses statutory subject matter should not focus on which
of the four categories of subject matter a claim is directed to—process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter—but rather on the
essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its practical
utility." 143 The court further trumpeted that:
Today, we hold that the transformation of data, representing
discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of
mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes
a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula,
or calculation, because it produces "a useful, concrete and
tangible result"—a final share price momentarily fixed for re-
cording and reporting purposes and even accepted and re-
lied upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent
trades.'"
The Federal Circuit then turned to the district court's business
methods rejection, opting to "take [the] opportunity to lay this ill-con-
ceived exception to rest."'" According to Judge Rich, restrictions upon
patents for methods of doing business were ill-conceived from the start
and no longer the law under the 1952 Patent Act. 146 Following issuance
of the State Street opinion, methods of doing business were to be subject
only to the same patentability analysis as any other sort of process."'
State Street is a curious opinion on a number of fronts. First, the
court's characterization of the patented invention as generating a
"final share price" appears inaccurate.'" Neither the term "final share
price" nor its reasonable approximation appears in any of Signature's
"0 See State Street, 149 F.3t1 at 1377.
I'll Id. at 1373 (quoting Alappat, 33 F.3(1 at 1544).
' 12 See id. at 1375.
143 Id.
Id. at 1373.
145 See State Sheet, 149 F.3(1 at 1375.
"6
 See id.
147 fit,
"0 See id.
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claims, which are instead directed towards the processing of data re-
lating to portfolio income, expenses and net gain or loss. 14° This inter-
pretation seems especially odd in light of an earlier opinion by Judge
Rich, In re Iwahashi, which admonished that the precedents have "held
sonic claims statutory and other claims nonstatutory, depending en-
tirely on what they said."' 50
The State Street court also squarely stated that the district court
had erred by applying the Freeman-Waller-Abele test.''' According to the
court, "(aifter Diehr and Chakrabarty, the Freeman-Walter-Abek test has
little, if any, applicability to determining the presence of statutory
subject matter."'" As a matter of chronology, this statement is plainly
false: the Supreme Court issued Chakrabarty in 1980 1 " and Diehr in
1981. 1 '4 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals authored Abele in
1982. 1 '
This aberrant reinterpretation of Diehr and Chakrabarty does a
disservice to the many Federal Circuit opinions that have applied the
Freeman-Walter-Abele test in patent eligibility determinations. 156 More-
over, it misreads the Chakrabarty decision. In Chakrabarty, the Court
expressly stated that a "claim for an improved method of calculation,
even when tied to a specific end use, is unpatentable subject matter
under § 101.'1 " This standard appears to provide ample basis for
striking down Signature's claimed "system," which does nothing more
than maintain the accounting books for a particular financial product.
In addition, the State Street court failed to acknowledge fully Mau-
Corps and Meyer; as well as the manner in which those cases had been
treated in Alappizt.' 58 Each of those opinions rejected claims analogous
to those of Signature's patent. 150 The Federal Circuit declined to follow
these decisions, stating only that "closer scrutiny of these cases reveals
that the claimed inventions in both Mataorps and Meyer were rejected
as abstract ideas under the mathematical algorithm exception, not the
"9 See supra note 124.
1 "888 F.2(1 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Fur more on lioahashi, see Thomas, .supra note 121,
at 258-59.
151 See 149 17.3d 111 1373.
152 Id. at 1374.
153 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
151 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
155 684 F,2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
15",S'ee, e.g., Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, I058 (Fed.
Cit .. 1992); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839-40 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
I" 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (yawing Parker v. Hook. 437 U.S. 584, 595 n.18 (1978)).
"See State StrM, 149 F.3d at 1374-75; supra notes 79-86, 115-17 and accompanying text.
159 See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
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business method exception. " 1i° But this distinction tells us only that the
district court's first basis for invalidating Signature's patent should have
been affirmed. It also fails to inform us why the statement of the. en
bane court in Alappat that "a business methodology" does not fulfill
the strictures of § 101 is no longer the law.'GP
In perhaps the most telling line of the opinion, the State Street
court noted that the key inquiry concerning statutory subject matter
involves "the essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particu-
lar, its practical utility." 162 This remark by the court collapses the subject
matter inquiry into another patentability requisite, that of utility. The
utility standard has always been a minimal one, requiring only that the
invention confer a "specific benefit . . . in currently available form." 16'
The difficulty with this approach is that, since the early nineteenth
century, the utility standard has been understood to present a distinct,
additional hurdle to paten tability.'G 4
 This dramatic reinterpretation of
the statute reduces the statutory categories of patentable subject matter
to little more than claim-formatting protocols. 165 As a result, section
101 seemingly bars few, if any, applications for patent. After State Street,
it is hardly an exaggeration to say that if you can name it, you can claim
At bottom, the Federal Circuit also said much more than necessary
with regard to methods of doing business. The claims of the patent
were not directed to methods at all, but to computer hardware pro-
grammed to perform certain calculations.' 67 In fact, the court noted
that the patent application as originally filed included method
claims. 168
 But the applicant had abandoned them following examiner
concerns over patentable subject matter. 169 Given the absence of
160 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1370.
161 See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1541; supra note 118 and accompanying text.
162 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375.
163 13renner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966). See also In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1508
(Fed. Cir. 1995); see generally Michelle L. Johnson, Comment, In re Braila and the utility Exami-
nation Guidelines: A Light at the End of the Tunnel?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 285 (1996); Andrew T.
Right, Note, Pregnant with Ambiguity Credibility and the PTO Utility Guidelines in Light of Brenner,
73 180. U. 997 (1997).
161 See Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1,217); Lowell v. Lewis, 15
Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,508).
1115 See supra note 38 and accoMpanying text
1 c4 See Robert I'. Merges, Comtherrial Success and Patent Standards.' Economic Perspectives on
In novation,  76 Cu.. L. REV. 805, 811-12 (1988) (inning that the utility requirement has "devolved
over the years into a rather mi11i11 al obstacle to obtaining a patent.").
167 Slate Street, 149 F.3d at 1371-72.
lc° See id. at 1371.
119
 See id.
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method claims in the patent at suit—not due to happenstance but
because of their knowing deletion by the applicant—this portion of
the State Street opinion may amount to nothing more than dicta.
Thus, enthusiastic commentators may have read too much into
the State Street opinion. 71 0 still, each issue of the Patent Office Gazette
seems to include another patented business method. 171 For one exam-
ple of recent Patent Office work product, consider the following claim:
A method for remodeling an existing building, said method
comprising: cataloging design ideas that utilize predeter-
mined building products; presenting the design ideas to a
client; allowing the client to select a design idea . . . [and]
rlo See, e.g., Leigh Buchanan, Can nu Actually Patent a Business Model? A Recent Decision
firm the Patent and Trademath Office Says Thu Can. And That Isn't Good News for Entrepreneurs,
INC., Nov. 1, 1998, at 83; It Was My Idea, "DIE ECONONI1ST, Aug. 15, 1998, at 54 . (interpreting State
Street 10 hold that "business models are generally patentable if they are unique —just like any
other invention that is 'new and useful"); Edith Updike, What's Next—A Patent For The 401(k)?,
Bus. WK., Oct. 26, 1998, at 104.
The more recent opinion in AT&T cmp. rt Esyel COMM t4 nirations, The. suggests that the
Federal Circuit has taken an expansive reading of State Street. See 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
That appeal arose from an infringement suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Delware. See id. al 1353. District Count jtulge Robinson had described the patent-in-suit as
"claiming an invelition whereby certain information that is already known within a telecommu-
iiicaticnis system (the [long-distance service carriers] oldie originating and terminating subscrib-
ers) is simply retrieved for all allegedly tiew use in billing." AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications,
Inc. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5346 at *20 (Mar. 27, 1908). Without the benefit of the Federal
Circuit's Slate Street opinion, the district court held that "a change in the data's format should
not serve to consent non-patentable subject matter into patentable subject matter." See id. at *22.
The Federal Circuit reversed on am.peal, concluding that the ctahned invention "I fell] comfortably
svit bin the broad scope of patentable subject matter under s. 101." AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1361. The
count described the Stale Street formadation of patent eligibility as holding "that a mathematical
algorithm may be all integral part of patentable subject matter such as it machine or process if
the claimed invention as a whole is applied in a 'useful' manner." Id. at 1357.
The AT&Topittion confirms that the test of pate' Liability has heen reduced to die inquiry
into whether an invention produces a "tangible, useful, result." See id. at 1361.
171 See supra. note 10. An extremely interesting question is whether the patent involved in the
seminal opinion Afarkman a Virestview Instruments could itself he classified as a business metluxl
patent. 772 F. Supp, 1535 (F.D. Pa. 1991), 40/ 52 E3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1905), aff'd 517 U.S. 370
(1096). The Markman patent claimed an "it iventory control and reporting system" for monitoring
and reporting the status, location and 111(Wel1ICIII of "inventory" in a dry-cleaning establishment.
See Malitman, 52 F.3d at 972. At trial, Markman asserted that the claim term "inventory" encom-
passed customer invoices and transaction totals which read On an accused device that tracked
invoices, but not the location of laundry as it moved through the dry-cleaning process. See
'Walkman, 772 F. Stipp. at 1536-37. The district. court disagreed, holding that the claim term
"inventory" was restricted to "articles or clouting." See id. at 1537. Both the en bane Federal Circuit
and Supreme Court upheld the latter interpretation. See Markman, 52 F.3d 067, aff'd, 517 U.S.
370. Had Markman prevailed, one wonders whether las claimed system of tracking money mid
claim slips should have been subject to scrutiny under § 101.
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preparing a visual image .. . representing the building re-
modeled with the design idea selected by the client.' 72
Wholly divorced from particular artifacts, this claim broadly appro-
priates an architectural services technique.' i 3 Recently issued Patent
Office Guidelines further suggest that other business, artificial in-
telligence and mathematical proces-sing applications are firmly with-
in the grasp of the patent system. 174
Of course, the task of leading the courts on patentability standards
falls to the Patent Office.'m In some sense, State Street merely presents
the latest in a series of cases confirming Patent Office practice regard-
ing the subject matter appropriate for patenting. But in many ways,
State Street presents the most disturbing episode yet. It is one thing for
courts to place biotechnologies and computer-related inventions with-
in the patent system, but quite another to hold that business methods
may be patented. One need only recall the techniques of the Hanseatic
Leaguem or the theory of mercantilismm to realize that such methods
are far older than the patent system itself. Yet only recently has it been
suggested that this sort of practical knowledge may be appropriated by
way of the patent system.' 78
 The remainder of this Article discusses the
172 "Metliod for designing and illustrating architectural enhaticenieins to existing
U.S. Patent No. 5,668,736.
173 See id.
171 See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR
COMPUTER RELATED INVENTIONS, TRAINING MATERIALS DIRECTED TO BUSINESS, ARTIFICIAL IN-
TELLIGENCE:, AND MATHEMATICAL PROCESSING APPLICATIONS (last MOdilied Oct. 20, 1998)
<littp://www.uspto.gov/web/olfices/pac/compextunicoinguide.linn >.
175 A5 judge Slayer noted in Morton Ina Inc. v. Cardinal Chem, Co.:
Every year about 100,000 new patents are issued, resailting iii well over 1,000,000
patents in force in this country at any dine. These patents are issued by the Patent
and Trademark Office clothed in a presumption of validity as a matter of law and
of practicality. The Patent and Trademark Office, after all, consumes a tremendous
annual budget, 'wady a half billion dollars, and employs thousands of highly
Rained  halividuals workiiig to insure that 01tly deserving patents are issued. This
court, on the other hand, might see oily one hundred and fifty or so contested
patents a yeart including repeaters. We therefore see at most no inure than 0.015%
of the patents in force. (citations omitted)
fi F.3d 1464, 1472 (Fed. Cif. 1993) (Mayer, J., concurring)
176 See generally TEL LLOYD, ENGLAND AND THE GERMAN HANSE, 1157-1611: A STUDY OF
THEIR TRADE AND COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY (1991); JOHANNES SCHILDHAUER, THE HANsA: His-
Tow,' AND CULTURE (Katherine Va110VIICI1 1111115., 1985).
177 See generally LARS MAGNUSSON, MERCANTILISM: TILE SHAPING OF AN ECONOMIC LANGUAGE
(1904): LEONARD GOMES, FOREIGN TRADE AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMY: MERCANTILIST AND
CLASSICAL. PERSPECTIVES (1987).
171 III this regard, .Stale Street holds particularly unsettling possibilities for inventors who
maintained their business methods as trade secrets. Under the rule articulated by judge Learned
Hand in Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Pealing CT' Auto Parts, It firm that put a business method
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appropriate range of patentable subject matter, next exploring the
expansive patenting opportunities suggested by State Street.
II. THE EXTENT OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL ARTS
That the dialogue of patent law itself scarcely limits the possibili-
ties of patenting presents a source of concern. If the only remaining
restraints upon patentable subject matter are the lenient strictures of
novelty or utility, then the pretensions of the patent system have ex-
panded vastly beyond its traditional province of industrial technolo-
gies."`' Although the patent system has caught up with current tech-
nology, it has done little to refine its sense of its own subject matter
other than to say that patents properly canvas the entire waterfront
of technique. In the regime of patents, technology has become not
merely artificial object or industrial activity, but the entire body of
human knowledge unencumbered by further qualification.
Among the more reviled Patent Office grants has been its 1968
patent on a method of swallowing a pill.'" Now we need scant imagi-
nation to envision patents on corporate ingestion of poison pills as
well. With business and medical tethniques 181 firmly under wing, and
patents on sports methods 182 and procedures of psychological analy-
sis'" trickling out of the Patent Office, patents appropriating almost
any sort of communicable practice seem easily attainable. Claims to
methods within the disciplines of sociology, political science, econom-
ics and the law appear to present only the nearest frontier for the
regime of patents. Under increasingly permissive Federal Circuit case
law, techniques within such far-flung disciplines as language, 184 the fine
into commercial practice for more than one year, but maintained the method as a trade secret,
is barred from obtaining a paten on the invention. See 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946). Moreover,
third parties are free to iratent the method. See D.L. Auld Cu. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 714
F.2d 1144, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Because business method innovators may have opted For trade
secret prt:Aection based upon the traditional rule that such methods were impateniable, a
practical effect of State Street may be to convert the first inventors of business methods into
Mirth tgers.
179 See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
l"See "Method of swallowing a pill," U.S. Patent No. 3,418,990.
lnl See infra notes 250-05 and accompanying text..
182 See generally Carl A. Kukkonen, III, Be a Good Sport and Refrain from Using My Patented
Putt: Intellectual Properly Protection For Sports Related Movements, 801 PAT. & TRADEMARK Off,
Soc'v 808 (1998).
183 See 'Character assessmen t method," U.S. Patent No. 5,190,458.
18.1 See "Method of using a created international language as an intermediate pathway in
translation beliveen two tuitional lin tguages," U.S. Patent No. 4,864,503; see also The Wired Diaries,
7.01 WIRED 97, 135 (1999) (attributing to Norman Fischer, Abbot, Green Gulch Farm Zen Colter,
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arts 185
 and theology's [' also now appear to be within the realm of pat-
entability.
We have good reason to doubt whether such innovations lie within
the "useful Arts," the constitutional stricture concerning patentable
subject matter.'" The sparse materials we possess regarding this term
suggest that it is unlikely the Framers saw every created thing as
encompassed within it. 188 They undoubtedly contemplated the indus-
trial, mechanical and manual arts of the late eighteenth century, in
contrast to the seven "liberal arts" and the four "fine arts" of classical
learning.' 89
 In addition, the Framers were undoubtedly aware of the
English experience leading to the Statute of Monopolies.m The prin-
cipal aim of that legislation was to proscribe grants of monopolies
except for any letters patent providing the exclusive right "of the sole
working or makinge of any manner of New Manufactures within this
Realine, to the true and first. Inventor."' 9 ' In a passage made particu-
larly worthy of consideration given the State Street decision, in 1951,
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals explained that the inclusion
of the patent and copyright clause in the Constitution "doubtlessly was
due to the fact that those who fornmlated the Constitution were famil-
iar with the long struggle over monopolies so prominent in English
the observation that "[[]lie real technology—behind all of our other technologies—is language.
It actually creates the world our consciousness lives in.").
185 See "Method of high resolution silk screen printing," U.S. Patent No. 5,730,052. But see
Greenewalt v. Stanley Co., 54 F.2d 195, 196 (3d Cir. 1931) ("We do not find authority in the law"
for the issuance of a patent for results dependent upon such intangible, illusory, and nonmaterial
things as emotional or aesthetic reactions.").
186 See "System for allowing a person to experience systems of mythology," U.S. Patent No.
5,734,795.
157 See Vincent Chiappena, Patentability of Computer Software Instruction as an "Article of
Manufacture:" Software as Such as the Right Sluff 171 MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. 1.. 89,
129-34 (1998).
188 SettTitE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 271-72 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The
copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right of common law.
The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belting to the inventors. The public
good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals."). 111adison's reference to
contemporary British law hardly suggests a radical view of patentable subject matter.
I89 See Robert I. Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts, Part II, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'r
487, 494-96 (1952). "The seven historic 'liberal arts' were: grammar, logic (dialectics), rhetoric,
alithmetic, geometry, music mid asnottolny[.] The four 'fine arts' were: painting, drawing,
architecture and sculpture: to which were often added: poetry, music, dancing and drama." M.
at 494.
l"See Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts: Amoh.7an Patent Law
and Administration, 1787-1836 (Part 2), 801 PAT. & TRADEMARK OF•'. SOC'Y 11, 26-27 (1908).
trt 21 Jam. 1, ch. 3, § 6.
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history, where exclusive rights to engage even in ordinary business
activities were granted so frequently by the Crown . . . ." 1 "2
One can properly question whether the State Street panel respected
the policy concerns that animated the Statute of Monopolies. Yet, in
fairness to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
articulation of a useful typology between technology and other aspects
of human culture has proven exceptionally difficult. Human engage-
ment with the artificial is now so complete that distinguishing things
that are technological from those that are not has perplexed not only
the courts, but even epistemologists and the most accomplished of
technological observers.'"
Economic analysis may offer some suggestions about the propriety
of patents within particular areas of endeavor. Following State Street,
economists may be able to tell us whether the patent system would
benefit or harm particular industrial sectors by influencing such factors
as the engagement in unproductive activity, rate of innovation or mar-
ket concentration. Whether an 'economic analysis would recommend
expansion of the patent system to include the financial services indus-
try is uncertain. In-house use of financial products appears to be
extremely difficult to track, for the only observable throughput consists
of profits and losses on investor balance sheets)" The policing of
financial services patents would also require costly infringement
searches—just the sort of activity a sound patent system should discour-
age.
Economists might also express concerns over the similarities be-
tween the claims of Signature's patent and portions of the Internal
Revenue Code) 95 The individual who drafted Signature's claims was
keenly aware of tax law, for portions of the claim read word-for-word
with the pertinent tax statute and regulations. This attempt at private
appropriation of the tax laws brings to mind efforts to claim copyright
to jump citations) 96 The commentators who expressed concerns over
this use of the copyright laws would undoubtedly be more deeply
192 1n to Yuan, 188 F.2(1 377, 380 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (emphasis added).
193 Sri? CARL NI run IATI, `DUNKING Tin:Dm-Hi TEcHNoLoGy: THE PATH BETWEEN ENGINEERING
AND l'int.osoritv 154-60 (1094).
191 we supra times 125-31 mid accompanying text.
19:' See 26 U.S.C. § 706(d) (1004); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(6), (I) (1904) ("Determination of
distributive share whctI partner's interest changes"); Richard Stern, Scope-of-Protection Problems
with Patents and Copyrights on Methods of Doing Business 13-14 (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Boston College Law Realm).
196jialip citations provide the specific liage on which a jtidicial opinion recites a desired point
of law,
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troubled by Signature's use of the more robust patent right. 197 If, as the
Federal Circuit noted in State Street, the only practical tax code com-
pliance mechanism for sophisticated financial products consists of
computerized accounting, 198
 then economists may well possess the best
set of tools for predicting the impact of patents ixsembling the Signa-
ture patent.
The difficulties with such attempted analyses should be apparent.
Legal economists simply possess no experience with patents of this sort
and appear disinclined to seek out empirical evidence that might
sustain their analysis. Lacking any data whatsoever as to the potential
effect of the patent system in the fields of finance and other disciplines,
economic evaluation of this issue can often be reduced to thought
experiments offered in the same vein as traditional legal analyses.
Although we should be grateful for whatever insights logical reasoning
might provide regarding, for example, the downward-sloping demand
curve, so too should we call for data-gathering and refinement when
economic analysis is applied to the discipline of intellectual property 199
This Article instead draws support from comparative legal studies
and that body of thinking referred to as the philosophy of technology.
Such an approach requires a sympathetic reading of previous attempts
to explain the place of technological activities within the whole of
human endeavor. Although not the place to develop a comprehensive
metaphysics of human undertakings, this Article does attempt to apply
this learning to consider whether any technique that achieves prag-
matic results should be patentable.
In doing so, this Article follows the tack of many courts by employ-
ing the word "technology" synonymously with the constitutional term
"useful Art." 200
 Although not in common use at the time the Constitu-
tion was written, the term "technology" has eclipsed the "useful Arts"
197 See generally Alfred C. Yen, The Danger of Bootstrap Formalism in Copyright, 5 J. Iesn'ELL.
Nor. L. 453 (1998); Robin Lee Pedersen, Continent, West Publishing Co. so Mead Data Central,
Inc. (Levis), 14 RUtGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 359 (1988); James It Wyman, Comment, Freeing
the Law: Case Rtporter Copyright and the Universal Citation System, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. Y i7
(1996).
198
 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
I" See George I... Priest, Mat Economists Can Tell Larlos About Intellectual Property: Comment
on Cheting, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTs AND COPY-
Ricarrs 10, 19-20 (Iolut Palmer Richard 0. Zerbe, jr,, eds., 1086) ("The ratio of empirical '
demonstration to assumption lit this literature 'applying economic analysis to the field of intel-
lectual prOperty1 must be very close to zero ... , I do not believe that it is unfair to say that the
... literature ......which 1 am aware 111as1 consisted of little more thrum assumptions. As a
consequence, this literature has taught its almost nothing, for has it guided research or thinking
so that an approach with a firmer empirical base could he developed.").
2`0° See supra tune 12.
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as indicating disciplines concerned with practical, utilitarian activity.
Derived from the Greek word "techne,"2°' the word "technology" did
not appear in English documents until the start of the seventeenth
century. 2°2 A 1706 dictionary defined "technology" as "a Description of
Arts, especially the Mechanical," suggesting the identity of these
terms." The term "technology" is not only less cumbersome, it also
promotes the application of a diversity of thought about this most
dominant aspect of contemporary society.
A. From Applied Science to Rational Action
As the first English work to employ the term "technology" in its
title, Jacob Bigelow's 1829 Elements of Technology serves as a good
starting point for exploring the meaning of that term. Bigelow defined
technology as "the principles, processes, and nomenclatures of the
more conspicuous arts, particularly those which involve applications of
science."" Bigelow's view of technology as applied science remains
popular today, enlisting such supporters as Joseph Henry,205 Vannevar
Bush20° and John Kenneth Galbraith. 207 Even the Patent Office has
adopted this position, defining technology as "the application of sci-
ence and engineering to the development of machines and procedures
in order to enhance or improve human conditions, or at least to
improve human efficiency in some respect."2"8
But the simple view of technology as applied science cannot with-
stand a sustained analysis. Historical technologists constructed artifacts
ranging from arches to airplanes without any systematic knowledge of
statistics or aerodynamics.209 Contemporary scientific disciplines from
astronomy to particle physics further suggest that this definition is
skewed, for they rely so heavily upon instrumental technologies that
they could fairly be described as applied technologies. 210
historians have demonstrated that overreliance upon scientific knowl-
201 See DON BIDE, I) / GLOSOPI 0. or TECHNOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 26 (1993).
202 See MITGIIAnt , Mika note 193, at 114-15.
203 See id. at 130.
201 [ Acots BIGELOW, ELEMENTS OF TECHNOLOGY at v (1829).
203 See E.T. Layloti,jh, American ideologies of Science and Engineering, 17 	 AND Otn:rtinE
688, 001 (1976).
200 See StranxrA DASGUPTA, TECHNOLOGY AND CREATIVITY 151 (1906).
207 See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL. STATE 12 (2d ed. 1071).
2011 Examination Guidelines fbr Comptuer-Related inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7479 n.7
(1996) Ihereinafter Software Guidelities1 (quoting CometrrEn DICTIONARY 38 ,1 011iCEOSOB PICSS,
2d ed. 1994)).
2171 See GEORGE BASALLA, THE EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGY 27-28 (1088).
210 See IHDE, Allpla 1101C 201, at 72-78.
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edge has sometimes hindered technological development, as successful
product design proceeds more often from "bottom-up" development
than "top-clown" extension of scientific theories. 21'
Last, this position fails to appreciate the extraordinary differences
between the tools, attitudes and experimental methods of scientific
and engineering practice.'" Granted, some of the theoretical tools
used in engineering design are derived from science, but many are
not. In particular, the set of idealized artifacts, technical skills and
pragmatic considerations indigenous to engineering practice have lit-
tle place in scientific endeavors. Technology is much more than ap-
plied scientific knowledge—it is itself a distinct form of knowledge. 2"
Dissatisfied with a science-based definition, individuals have
sought other bases for understanding the technological realm. In an
era of intensive individual interaction with the artificial, we should not
be surprised to find exceptionally broad definitions of what comprises
the technological realm. Dictionaries define technology as "bodies of
skills, knowledge, and procedures for making, using and doing useful
things"214 or "systematic knowledge and action, usually of industrial
processes but applicable to any recurrent activity."215 Essayist Daniel
Bell tells us that "[technology is the instrumental ordering of human
experience within a logic of efficient means."" Commentator
Frederick Ferre would go further, defining technology as the "practical
implementations of intelligence." 217 Furthermore, in concluding that
individual methods of media communications present their own mes-
sages, Marshall McLuhan noted that:
[I]t makes no difference whether one considers as artifacts
. . . things of a tangible "hardware" nature such as bowls and
clubs or forks and spoons, or tools and devices and engines,
railways, spacecraft, radios, computers and so on; or things of
a "software" nature such as theories or laws of science, philo-
sophical systems, ... forms or styles in painting or poetry or
211 See Ronald Faille, Science and Engineering Theory in the Invention and Development of the
Induction Moto); 1880-1900, 28 Tlicii, & CUITIIRE 283 (1987).
212 SeeDAsGuPTA, supra note 206, at 152-56; fiturcnAtii- , supra note 193, at 199-204.
201
	 MnrcilAsi, supra note 193, at 203; 1.C. Jamie, Technology and the Structure of Knowledge,
lR PHH.OSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY: READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF TECHNOLOGY
54, 55 (Carl Mitcham & Robert Mackey, eds. 1972).
211 15 INTERNATIONAL. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 576 (1968).
215 MCCRAW-HILL CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA of SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 1876 (Med. 1994).
216 DANIEL BELL, THE WINDING PASsAGE: ESSAYS AND SOCIOLOGICAL JOURNEYS, 1960-1980
at 20 (1980).
217 FREDERIGN. FERRE, PHILOSOPHy OF TECHNOLOGY 26 (1988).
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drama or music, and so on. All are equally artifacts, all equally
human.218
Paradigmatic of this embracing vision of technology is the disci-
pline of cybernetics.''' Since its emergence from early research in
neurophysiology and gradual expansion into information theory and
artificial intelligence, cybernetics has considered its subject matter "the
domain of all possible machines."22° Disinterested in whether a ma-
chine is "electronic, mechanical, neural, or economic," cybernetics
pursues the goal of communication and control of any regular, deter-
minate or reproducible behavior. 2-'t The cybernetic vision of a device
as a series of linked information stages expands the possibilities of
technological knowledge to dizzying heights. Ultimately, cybernetics
offers nothing less than "the framework on which all individual.ma-
chines may be ordered, related, and understood"222—a unified theory
of material, social and mental phenomenon. 22 "
The view of patentable subject matter expressed in State Street
fairly reflects these developments in our philosophy of technology. 224
judg ing methods of doing business as within the ambit of the patent
system also presents a pretentious view of technological activity, one
that has come to reject a scientific backdrop and instead conclude that
the term "technology" connotes any form of rational human action.
Any technique for achieving efficiency in any sphere of human en-
deavor appears amenable to patenting, so long as that method is
communicable and capable of achieving a useful result.
Yet few of us would suppose that inventions within the domain of
business, law or fine arts constitute technology, much less patent-
able technology. The extreme inclusiveness of the field of cybernetics
hardly reflects mainstream notions of technology. Its constructions of
technology often amount to little more than provocative slogans that
conflate all forms of knowledge and that assume all human endeavors
are susceptible to rational manipulation. Other definitions appear to
suffer from their conciseness, presenting extreme views of technologi-
218 MARSHALL MCLUIIAN & ERIC MCLUIIAN, LAWS OF MEDIA: THE NEW SCIENCE 3 (1998).
210 S/1'pm/iv/Iv NORBERT WIENER, CYBERNETICS, OR CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION IN THE
ANIMAL AND TIM MACHINE (2d ed. 1961).
22°W. Ross Asunv, AN INTRODUCTION TO CVBERNE'EICS 2 (1956).
221 hi.
222 m. a t 2_3,
2" See MITCIIAM, supra note 193, at 205; Are also Allen Newell, Response: The Models Are
Broken, The Models Are Broken!, 47 U. Pref. L. REV. 11123, 1025 (1986) (collapsing distinctions
between the study of human behavior and computer science).
224 See supra notes 140-47 and acconipanying text.
1170	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 40:1130
cal phenomenon. 225 Still others are purposive, reflecting an effort to
subject technological issues to philosophical inquiry, or, even worse,
contemporary society to withering connentary 226
Surely we can articulate a more refined sense of that set of actions
and objects that we might judge as technological in character. 227 A
reasoned epistemology of human activity that reflects both our sense
of the technological order and the traditions of the patent system
would allow us to better define those subject matters that can be
patented and those that can not. This Article next takes up this effort,
turning to several discussions of the ontic dimension of technology.
B. Toward a Refined View of Technology
As a central aspect of modern life, technology has attracted a
justifiable amount of concern and commentary. Yet divergence con-
cerning the scope of this phenomenon has often hindered discourse.
The fields of engineering, epistemology, sociology, anthropology and
phenomenology have lent "technology" meanings that range from
artifacts, to knowledge, to sociotechnical systems of manufacture and
use.228 Despite the ubiquity of technology, no recognized taxonomy of
technological characteristics exists.
Perceptive commentators have attempted to lend congruence and
structure to this dialogue by unpacking the term "technolog "229 A
review of this literature holds promise for the patent system as well. As
the principal legal response to technological change, the regime of
patents has suffered from its inability to develop a coherent sense of
its own subject matter. This Article turns first to Robert McGinn's
sustained effort to define the technological realm.
In several publications addressing technology policy McGinn has
consistently identified technology as a manifestation of human culture
22r. See N. Bence Hammy Robert E. McGinn, The Anatomy of Modern Technology: Prolegome
non to an Improved Public Polity for the Social 111anagement of "Technology, 100 DAEDALUS 25, 26
(1080) ( -The nascent field of technology studies is littered with unsuccessful attempts to capture
and display the supposed Platoitic essence of technology in a succinct phrase or two.").
226 See generally jAcQuEs TIIE: TECHNOLOGICAL. SOCIETY (John Wilkinson trans., 1964);
HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN THE IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED INDUS-
TRIAL SOCIETY (1964); 1 LEWIS Mutdroitn, THE: MYTH OF THE MACHINE: TECHNICS AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT (19(16).
227 But see Rachel Landau, Introduction to THE NATURE OF TECIINOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE: ARE
MODELS OF SCIENTIFIC CilANGE, RELEVANT? 1, 5 (Rachel Landau ed., 1984) (noting that attempts
to demarcate technology from other activities are "probably fruitless").
228
 See l'Atu. W. DEVoRE, TEcttNot.oGv: AN INTRODUCTION 220-22 (1980); Michael Fores,
Some terms in the discussion of technology and innovation, 6 TE:Gu. & SOC .
 56 (1970).
229 See Steplicni. Kline, What is Thltnology?, 1 BULL. Set. TECH.	 Soc.'v 215 (1988).
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that takes its place alongside art, sport, philosophy and other endeav-
ors. 2"° Technology is not the same as these activities, however, and may
be distinguished by several traits. In an early article, What is Technol-
ogy?, McGinn observed that technological activity is a purposive, meth-
odological enterprise that fabricates or constitutes material out-
comes. 23 ' According to McGinn, technology should also be seen as a
resource-based and resource-expending endeavor that necessarily util-
izes or generates knowledge. He further suggests a rubric of "material
product-making or object-transforming activity" to distinguish that
which is technological:1'2
McGinn and his colleague, N. Bruce Hannay, further developed
this analysis by assessing technology in terms of its content and form.
Hannay and McGinn judged the content of technology to be "the
complex of knowledge, methods, and other resources used in making
a particular kind of product or in creating a particular procedural
system."2" 3 That technology could be used to manufacture products
seems straightforward, but some ambiguity surrounds their sense of a
"procedural system." Do they wish to connote discrete production
techniques or do they mean to invoke the entire social and physical
environment that surrounds the making of a particular kind of prod-
uct? While proceeding to describe the systems context of modern
technologies, Hannay and McGinn suggest the former:
Many products of modern technology, whether exhibiting in-
terior systematic complexity or not, are intimately intertwined
with, if not embedded in, complex sociotechnical support
systems on which their manufacture, use, and maintenance
depend, for example, telephones and cars. To purchase such
items is to gain admission into a web of complex sociotechni-
cal systems. To buy a car is, in a real sense, to buy into a com-
plex road, energy supply, parts distribution, maintenance,
registration, insurance, police, and legal systems [sic] .2"
To Hannay and McGinn, then, the fact that technologies are inevi-
tably embedded in cultural contexts does not render all human
endeavors into technologies themselves.
29°Sre koisERT E. NICGINN, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIFIT 16 (1991); Hannay &
McGinn, MOM now 225, at 26; Robert L. McGinn, Meal' is Thchnology?,1REs. IN PHIL. AM) TECH.
179, ISO (1978) hereinafier McGinn, 1.1 7//a/ is Melo nologyn.
231 See McGinn, Mull is Technolog?, ,supra note 230, at 180.
2:12 See id. at 181.
233 Hannay & MI:Chill. su/na note 225, at 27.
"'hi. at 28.
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Hannay and McGinn also identified several aspects of the form of
technology that contrast it with other human activities. The inputs to
technological processes consist of raw or already processed material
along with bodies of information. Technology involves knowledge of
the properties of its input resources, along with energy, information,
tools and perceptual and neuromuscular skills, to generate material
products and procedural systems. The function of technology is the
production, management and use of material objects, and the control
and enhancement of other forms of human activity. Technology is thus
concerned with design, fabrication and transformation. 235
Technology may also be distinguished by its environmental con-
text. As described by Hannay and McGinn:
[T]echnology differs from other activity-forms in that the
natural environment—both in respect to the meteorological
and creature-related: threats it poses to human survival, and
the spatiotemporal obstacles it presents to human desires for
communication and transport—is a factor that more power-
fully and more directly conditions technology than is the case
with other cultural forms, for example, religion and art. 236
Hannay and McGinn summarized their reasoning by characterizing
technology "as that form of cultural activity devoted to the produc-
don or transformation of material objects, or the creation of proce-
dural systems, in order to expand the realm of practical human
possibility."2J7
The views of Paul W. DeVore about the nature of technology,
developed in his eponymous textbook, complement those of Mc-
Ginn."8 DeVore, like McGinn, differentiates technological pursuits
from other spheres of human activity, noting that:
The character of thinking involved in creating a philosophi-
cal position, a new religion, or an alternate form of govern-
ment is different from the character of thinking involved in
technological activities. Thinking in technology is problem
specific and environmentally specific, concerned with effic-
iency and the relationship of elements in the behavior of a
total system."'
235 SIT id. at 27.
236 Id.
237 id .
238 See g-enerallyDEAbRE, supyr note 228.
239 Id. at 226.
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DeVore distinguishes technological knowledge from other types of
knowledge. Whereas non-technological knowledge has as its pur-
pose the creation of ideological and/or social systems, technologi-
cal knowledge is directed at adapting the physical environment to
the needs of its users. 24° DeVore also stresses that technology can
only be understood within the social milieu in which it is situated.
Yet he distinguishes technology from "the associative, ideological
and environmental systems of society" and studies the relationship
between technology and other disciplines. 2."
While contrasting technology and science, DeVore notes that the
goal of technology is "to create new and useful products, devices,
machines or systems."242 Technological pursuits differ from scientific
pursuits in that in the former, design is the key component for resolv-
ing problems of materials, energy, information and control. Examples
of such technological tools include machines, techniques and techni-
cal systems of production, transportation and communication. 243
Carl Mitcham has also recently engaged in a comprehensive dis-
cussion of the nature of technology.24 4 Building on the analysis of
McGinn and his predecessors, Mitcham develops a framework for
philosophical analysis that explores technology as manifested in ob-
jects, knowledge, activity and volition. 215 Most useful here is his devel-
opment of a philosophy of action that embraces technology. In a
discussion oriented toward patentable processes, development of the
sense of technology as a behavioral engagement holds great potential
for refining an ontology of technology. Although the term "technol-
ogy" etymologically implies knowledge, and is perhaps most routinely
conceptualized in physical terms, the meaning of technology is only
realized through doing. For only technological activity allows individu-
als to effect change in their environment by applying knowledge to
create or use physical artifacts. 24"
Mitcham identifies such paradigmatic technological activities as
"crafting, inventing, designing, manufacturing, working, operating and
main taining."247 To Mitcham, the essence of invention—that all-impor-
tant term in patent law—is "the concrete transformation of materials,
24° See id, at. 225.
241 Id. at 253.
242 Id. at 241.
213 See DEVORE, sup? note 228, at 182-212.
211 See generally MacuAnt, .8flptit note 103.
245 Se' id, at 157-60.
216 See id. at 200.
247 1d. at 210.
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[which makes] an imagined transformation physically real." 248 He con-
trasts engineering design with artistic creation:
Art also is concerned with imagining, but its images cannot
be quantitatively analyzed—they are not subject to any well-
developed calculus. Thus art, in contrast to engineering, ap-
pears as both more intuitive and more dependent on the
senses. Although artists too are concerned to design [sic]
artifacts, they necessarily do so in drawings and models that
remain much closer in their reality to the final product.
Compare, for instance, a Rembrandt sketch for [sic] a paint-
ing with an engineering drawing of a building. Even the
Rembrandt sketch is art; the engineering drawing is simply
thrown away. 249
Mitcham would also distinguish between technology and tech-
nique. He suggests that technology emphasizes the rational manipula-
tion of external artifacts, while technique concerns the training of the
human body and mind. 254
 Thus, we can speak of the technique of
hitting a baseball or organizing a political party, but not of its "tech-
nology." Although technique contains unrationalized components,
technology is concerned with the conscious articulation of rules and
principles. To Mitcham, the core of the technological project concerns
the "desire to transform the heuristics of technique into [the] algo-
rithms of practice.""' •
Mitcham also cautions against viewing all human behavior as tech-
nology. While exploring the possibilities of technological usings, he
notes that:
[H]uman activities that have a self-contained quality about
them, such as looking at a painting, reading a book, or play-
ing the violin, seem most incorrectly described simply as use;
indeed, to do so is common only when the user has missed
the point of the objects concerned, that is, has failed to
engage them in the proper manner. If a person [were] de-
scribed as "using a book" one would be likely to think that he
was doing something other than reading it—sitting on it,
maybe. 2"2
248 /d. at 216.
2-19 MITCIIAM, so/wa note 193, at 230.
2:M See id. at 236.
2!il
252 Id. at 232.
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A review of commentators such as McGinn, DeVore and Mitcham
illustrates that we can achieve a structured definition of technology.
Although embedded in social systems, technology is an endeavor that
both intuition and sustained analysis would distinguish from other
aspects of human society. In brief, technology may be characterized as
knowledge that is applied toward material enterprise, guided by an
orientation to the external environment and the necessity of design.
In the next Part, this Article attempts to apply these studies to the
patent project, moving from a characterological to a definitional strat-
egy
III. STATUTORY SOLUTIONS TO PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
Contemporary thought demonstrates that we can achieve a re-
fined sense of that set of activities that are properly conceived of as
technological. Yet applying this learning to the patent project is by no
means straightforward. This Article reviews two possible mechanisms
for affirming our sense of the technological in .patent law. The first is
piecemeal in character. As exemplified by the recent United States
experience regarding patents on methods of medical treatment, we
might selectively prohibit patenting or constrain the remedies available
to patentees in certain areas of endeavor. Another possibility is the
adoption of an essentialist definition that more completely captures
our sense of technology. Taking as its touchstone the so-called "indus-
trial application" standard prevalent in the world's patent statutes, this
Article also explores the possibility of incorporating this standard in
United States patent law.
A. Patents and the Professions: The Medical Experience
A broad sense of patentable subject matter raises concerns not
only about the proper scope of the technology, but also about the
range of professionals who might seek protection of the patent system.
Because the patent law is bounded by the requirement of non-obvious-
ness, it concerns knowledge that exceeds the state of the art. 253 In
contemporary society this sort of knowledge is held not just by follow-
ers of particular occupations, but by members of many different pro-
fessions. A broad view of patentable subject matter arguably makes
certain shared characteristics of the so-called "liberal professions" (law,
medicine, teaching and the ministry) amenable to patenting: the use
253 See 35 U.S.C. § 10:1(a) (1994).
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of raw materials as an integral part of systematic learning, the practi-
cal application of learning and the reliance on communicable tech-
niques."'
Other professional norms, however, suggest that these tradition-
ally patent-free professions may resist the prospect of extensive appro-
priation of their techniques. Patents have the potential to constrain
professionals in the exercise of autonomous responsibility in their
practices. Furthermore, the ability of a profession to serve the public
good may also be affected by patenting, which could alter the willing-
ness of professionals to disseminate and put into practice new learning.
Most significantly, the tendency of professions to organize suggests that
a vocal and established lobby will he on hand to debate the place of
patenting within particular professional communities."'
The patent system has experienced this phenomenon before. For
decades, medical practitioners have obtained patents on methods of
medical treatment ranging from administering insulin to treating can-
cer. 256 Although traditionally few patentees had attempted to enforce
such patents,"7 in the early 1990s, Dr. Samuel Palliu alleged that an-
other physician had infringed his patent for a cataract surgery proce-
dure."8 The lawsuit led to a raging debate that questioned the impact
of patents on medical ethics, patient care and professional autonomy.
Although some urged that such patents offered individuals incentives
to invent and disclose new medical methods, others pointed to the
possibility that patents might restrict access to life-saving techniques,
lead to invasions of patient privacy and override the culture of disclo-
sure and peer review that pervades the medical community. 2"9
. Following the condemnation of patents on methods of medical
treatment by the American Medical Association House of Delegates,
Congress reacted by amending the Patent Act. As codified in § 287(c),
the new statute deprives patentees of remedies against medical practi-
tioners engaged in infringing "medical activity." 2"° Although the Patent
254 See MIKE W. MARTIN & RCHAND SCHINZINGER, ETHICS IN ENGINEERING 156 (1983).
25:1 See id.
234 See "Drugs and methods for Heating disease," U.S. Patent No. 5.456,063; "Method of
administration of insulin," U.S. Patent No, 5,364,838; see grnemlly D. Noonan, Patenting
Medical and Surgical Procedures, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF, SOC.'S• 651 (1995).
257 See Chris J. Katopis. Patients a. Patents?: Policy Implications of Recent Palefil Legislation, 71
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 329, 354-55 (1997).
238 See NMI] v. Singer, Cit.•, Nu. 5:03-202, 1095 WL 608365 (I). Vt. May 1, 1995).
239 See Beata Gocyk-Farber, Note, Patenting Medical Procedures: A Search for a Compromise
Between Ethics and Economics, 18 C.Attnozo L. Itts. 1527, 1544-51 (1997).
26°'35	 § 287(c) (West Stipp. 1099); seeC,eralrl J. iSlossitighoff, Remedies Under Patents
on Medical and Surgical Procedures, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 789, 789 (1996).
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Office may still issue patents on medical methods, the inability of such
instruments to provide their owner with any relief essentially renders
them unenforceable. 20 ' The response of the medical establishment may
serve as a good predictor of the reaction of other professions that are
newcomers to the patent system: Already, members of the business
community have expressed disbelief at the large number of patented'
business methods issuing from the Patent Office, particularly those
concerning Internet business models. 262 Whether business and other
professionals will, like physicians, possess the wherewithal to persuade
Congress to create particularized patent-free spheres of activity re-
mains to be seen. Few occupations are as well-organized, imbued with
a sense of profession and capable of employing the rhetoric of public
service as the practice of medicine.
But a more forceful impedinient to further amendtnents of the
patent statute is not practical but, rather, legal in character. Among the
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement, a component of the recently
executed World Trade Organization treaty, is that "patents shall be
available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to .. .
the field of technology. "263 That agreement :goes on to provide that
signatories may exclude from patentability "diagnostic, therapeutic
and surgical methods for the treatment of huixmans or animals. "264
Under a strict reading of the TRIPS Agreement, § 287(c) presents a
violation of this agreement: signatories may deny such patents alto-
gether but once issued, may not refuse to grant such patent holders
the full panapoly of rights and remedies available to other patentees.
Of course, this argument is rather technical. Recalling the maxim
non debit cui plus beet, quot minus est non licere—a form of the maxim
"the greater includes the lesser"-4he holders of medical method pat-
ents may not feel particularly aggrieved. 2" This is not so, however, for
5(I See Goeyk-Farber, supra note 259, at 1528.
262 See, g Bruce W. Partitive & Peter K. Trzyiia, Patenting in Insurance Starts Shaping Up
as Robust Discipline, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTII-FIN. SERVICES ED., Dcc. 14, 1998;
Richard A. Kaplan, Patenting Business Methods—A More Viable Option, 2 CID. LAW. 7 (1999);
Robert M. Kunstadt, Sneak Attack on U.S. htventiveness, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 9, 1998, at A21; Teresa
Riordan, &commerce Patents Reopen Legal Questions from the Past; Debate: Should a Business Method
Be Made Property?, Cli. Thm., Jan. 11, 1999, at 2.
2°3 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 27.
261 /d.
263 A more accurate translation of this phrase, attributed to the Roman jurist Ulpiau , is: "lie
to whom the greater is lawful ought not to be debarred from the less as ul bl B1. LAW
Dic.TioNARY 1052 (6111 ed. 1990). The most Famous use of the phrase in patent law occurred in
Justice Holmes' ttoteworthy dissent in Motion Picture Patents Co. V. Universal Film Mfg. Co„ 243
U.S. 502, 519-20 (1917).
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inventors in other disciplines. The solution reached in § 287(c) will
likely remain unique to the medical comtnunity. Piecemeal legislation
in response to an increasingly receptive patent system is an inadequate
solution. We must seek other mechanisms for obtaining sound parame-
ters of patentable subject matter. This Article turns to this task next,
seeking a more refined view of technological activity from comparative
legal analysis.
B. Industrial Application
A second method of limiting the scope of patent eligibility to the
technologiCal would be for Congress to add an essentialist definition
into our patent statute. In this regard, we can receive guidance from
two of the world's great patent statutes: the European Patent Conven-
tion266 and the Japanese _Patent Act. 207 Each of these laws requires that
inventions be susceptible to so-called "industrial applicatior• in order
to qualify for or receive patent p1otectioi1. 2° Concise, proven and
compatible with the TRIPS Agreement, the industrial applicability
requirement provides an apt way to limit the patent system to what we
understand to be technological.
The requirement that potential patents have an industrial appli-
cation has long been part of German patent law. As originally con-
ceived, patentable technologies were limited to those which involved
the treatment or processing of raw materials through mechanical or
chemical means. 269 The requirement has been more recently held to
require a "technical rule for the control of natural forces,"27° or, stated
somewhat differently, "a teaching for systematic activity using control-
lable natural forces for the attainment of a causally predictable re-
sult."271
266 See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, 13 1.L.M. 268 (1974) (amended by
Decision of the Administration Council of the European Patent Organization of Dec. 21, 1978)
[hereinafter European Patent Convention], The European Patent Convention creates a central-
ized mechanism for granting a set of national patents effective in the contracting states.
R67 See Japanese Patent Act, Law No. 121 of 1959 (amended 1998), available at Qtly://
vvwwjpo-miti.gojp/> (indexed at "Outline of industrial Property Systems": "Patent Law").
266 See European Patent Convention, supra note 266, art. 52; Japanese Patent Act, LIU. No.
121 of 1959, § 29(1).
260 See Rainer Monfang, Methods of Medical Treatment Under Patent Law, 24 INT'L. REV. INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 18, 22 (1993).
27° A.E.K. v. Federal Patent Office, 15 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 82, 83 (1984)
(reporting the September 21, 1982, opinion of the Swiss Supreme Court).
27 L Gert Kolle, The Patentable Invention in theEuropean Patent Convention, 5 INT'L REV. INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 140, 146 (1974).
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Currently, the .European Patent Convention presents the most ful-
some articulation of the industrial applicability standard. Article 52 of
the European Patent Convention stipulates that the following shall not
be considered patentable inventions: "(a) discoveries, scientific theo-
ries and mathematical methods; (b) aesthetic creations; (c) schemes,
rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing
business, and programs for computers; (d) presentations of informa-
tion."272 Article 57 of the European Patent ConventiOn goes on to
provide that "[a]n invention shall be considered as susceptible of
industrial application if it can be Made or used in any kind of industry,
including agriculture."273 In its Examination Guidelines, the European
Patent Office describes Article 57 as a reinforcing provision that ex-
cludes from patentability few inventions not set forth in Article 52. 274
That Article 52 expressly excludes "programs for computers" may
seem implausible to many, especially those familiar with the European
Patent Office  Gazette. In fact, the European Patent Office has drawn a
distinction between computer software per se and its application to-
wards the resolution of technical problems, excluding from patentabil-
ity only the former class of inventions. 275 Thus, such inventions as
manufacturing control software, signal processing and CAD/CAM sys-
tems have been held patentable: 276 The European Patent. Office has
also granted claims relating to computer functionality, including pro-
grains such as memory management, data organization and operating
systems. 277 Computer-related inventions relating to such matters as pro-
cessing text278 or learning to play a keyboard instrument, 279 however,
have been rejected as lacking a technical effect.
The Japanese Patent Office has also issued extensive guidelines
on„ the industrial application requirement. 28'} That agency views the
requirement of industrial application as complementing the Japanese
27 '2 Eutopcit1i Patent Convention, supra note 266, art. 52.
2`r1 Id. art. 57.
271 See GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN 'FITE EUROPEAN PATENT CIFFIGE, PaiY. C, at. 40 (1994)
("Guidelines for Substantive Examination: Industrial Application").
275 See general!' Sean." Hackett, Patent Protection in Europe for Software Inventions, 479 PRAT:,
LAW INST./PAT'. 889 (1997).
276 See MOM, Decision T 208/84, 84-4, 84-6 (1986), reprinted in CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF
PATENT AGENTS, EUROPEAN PATENTS HANDBOOK -(2(I ed. 1999).
277 See IBM, Decision T 6/83 (1988) ("Data Processor Network"), reprinled in CHARTERED
INSTITUTE OF PATENT AGENTS, EUROPEAN PATENTS tinsangooK (2d ed. 1999).
2 '4 See Document Abstracting and Retrieving, Decision T 22/85 (1988), reprinted in CHARTERED
INSTITUTE OF PATENT AGENTS, EUROPEAN PATENTS HANDBOOK (2d C(l. 1999).
270 See BEATTIE, Decision T 603/89, 89-9 (1990), reprinted in CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF
PATENT AGENTS, EUROPEAN PATENTS. HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1999).
281) Ser JAPANESE PATENT OFFIUF, IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION OF INDUSTRI-
1180
	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 40:1139
Patent Act's definition of a statutory invention—that is, the "creation
of technical ideas utilizing natural laws." 281 Inventions claiming discov-
eries or natural laws, personal skill, the simple presentation of infor-
mation, aesthetic creations and matter contrary to natural laws are all
considered non-statutory.282
The Japanese Patent Office Guidelines also identify a number of
inventions that fail to fulfill the standard of industrial application.
Methods of medical treatment and inventions so unworkable as to be
utterly incapable of practical deployment fall within this category. 283 In
addition, the Japanese Patent Office also denies patentability to inven-
tions that are not susceptible to mass marketing. Among such inven-
tions are those limited to individual use, such as a method of smoking
a cigarette. 284
Although the European and Japanese patent systems share the
industrial applicability requirement, the possibility that this standard
comports with the informed views of technological philosophy does
not appear promising at first glance. Patent laws and regulations lack
the quality of disciplined reflection apparent in the writings of techno-
logical philosophy. Indeed, the pronunciative and succinct nature of
these administrative texts contrasts strongly with the sustained and
reasoned discussion of other observers in delimiting that which is
technological.
But despite the different purposes and perspectives of these au-
thors, the industrial application standard appears very much in keep-
ing with the characterizations of technology offered by contemporary
technological thinking. In essence, both regimes recognize their own
subject matter by its distinguishing traits: production or transformation
of artifacts; interaction with the external environment; systematic ma-
nipulation of physical forces; and focus upon design. Technological
activities expend resources and knowledge in order to fabricate or
modify products, or to develop procedural systems. Finally, technology
presents a form of rational and systematic knowledge, oriented towards
efficiency and capable of being assessed through objective criteria. 28'
ALLY APPLICABLE INVENTIONS (I 1997), available at <littp://www.jpo-miti.gotjp/> (indexed in
"Examination InfOrmation") [hereinafter JPO GUIDELINES].
281 Seejapanese Paten' Act, Ltw No. 121 of 1959, art. 2(1).
282 See JPO GUIDELINES, SHpl'a note 280, § 1.1 (section entitled "Non-statutory inventions").
283 See id. § 2.1(1) (section entitled "Methods for treatment of human body by surgery or
therapy and diagnostic methods practised on the human body"), § 2.1(3) (section entitled
"Practically inapplicable inventions").
284 See id. § 2.1(2) (section entitled "Commercially; inapplicable inventions").
233 See supra notes 228-52 and accompanying text.
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As in other contexts, to include some things is to exclude others.
The touchstone of industrial application would exempt from the pat-
ent system matters of social observation or human behavior. Along with
techniques from economics, psychology and the social sciences, meth-
ods of doing business would also fail to meet the requirement of
industrial applicability. Business methods may be amenable to rea-
soned analysis and intended to make business practices more efficient,
but they are not transformative in character. They do not manipulate
physical forces to achieve the production or transformation of material
objects. Business methods engage economic principles rather than the
laws of physics, chemistry or biology. They do not comprise technology
and should not be within the grasp of the patent system.
The industrial application standard would also remove matters of
aesthetics or personal skill from the patent system. Culturally and
historically, we would not include endeavors in such fields as athletics,
dance or surgery as technological, and neither should our patent
system. To view these things as technology, as Mitcham suggests, is
awkward and inappropriate. 28" The skills and techniques involved in
swinging baseball bats, performing dance steps or dressing wounds call
for the manipulation of external objects; these aspects of human soci-
ety are principally acquired through personal experience. They do not
involve the creation or transformation of material objects and are not
repeatable in an industrial sense. We also lack objective mechanisms
necessary for evaluating this subject matter in terms of the requisites
of patentability.
The bearing of the industrial application standard towards claims
drafted in artifact format appears more complex. The State Street opin-
ion provides a fine example of this difficulty, for the claims at issue
there were drafted not in method format, but in terms of a "data
processing system" consisting of hardware elements. 287 This orientation
towards artifacts proved to be particularly cleft claim drafting, for the
Federal Circuit depended heavily on this characterization and repeat-
edly spoke of Signature's invention as a "machine" within the grasp of
the patent statute. 2"8 A machine, unlike a pure process claim directed
towards a business method, would at first blush appear susceptible to
industrial application. Yet if our sense of patent eligibility becomes
wholly subject to artful claim drafting, we have little hope of confining
the patent system to the technological. 289
286 see supra note 252 anti accomptuiying text.
287 See S PM notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
288 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
2 • See Thomas, supra note 121, at 257-61.
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Although the patent law of the United Kingdom reflects the Euro-
pean Patent Convention's requirement of industrial application, the
decision of the United Kingdom Patent Courts in Merrill Lynch pre-
sents a sensible resolution:29° In that case, the application at issue,
directed toward an automatic securities trading system, was analogous
to the patent application in State Street. Merrill Lynch's application
described a computerized system that allowed customers to buy and
sell stocks. The patent claims were set forth in functional terms, recit-
ing a data processing system for enabling a securities trading market. 29'
Following a rejection of the application by the examiner, Merrill
Lynch requested a healing at the United Kingdom Patent Office. The
principal examiner affirmed the rejection in reasoning that appears
fully applicable to the facts in State Street:
If the task performed is non-technical, for example a mathe-
matical calculation or a business method, then the mere fact
that it is being performed by a suitable machine, whether or
not this involves a program, does not of itself provide a tech-
nical feature. I consider this to be a logical extension of the
generally accepted view that there is no invention in merely
stating that a known manual function is performed automat-
ically even if this is expressed in terms of "means" for per-
forming the essential parts of the function.
I consider that the "means" specified . . relate to features
which either would be present in a conventional business
computer system or define essential features required for the
performance of the business method. Consequently this
claim contains nothing which could be considered to consti-
tute a new technical structure or to produce a technical effect
. . . . I conclude therefore that this claim does not constitute
a patentable invention:292
The United Kingdom Patent Court affirmed the ruling on ap-
peal:293
 Applying Article 52 of the European Patent Convention, the
court noted the argument of counsel that:
whether a patent could be obtained for a computer program,
itself novel and not obvious, would he a matter of drafting,
29() See	 Lynch lire. Application, 11988] R.P.D. & T.M. 1, affd, [1989] R.P.D.	 T.M.
501,
291 See id. at 8-9
292 Id. at 6.
2" See id. at 14.
September 19991	 PATEN7ING THE LIBERAL PROFESSIONS 	 1183
depending on the form of claim drafted. If claimed as a
computer program it would not be patentable as excluded
under [Article 52]; but a computer programmed to carry out
that program would be patentable even though a conven-
tional computer operating in a conventional manner when
carrying out the various steps of the program. That seems to
me to be a result that cannot have been intended by Parlia-
inent. 294
Similar analysis should apply to ``system" claims drafted to convey
the sense of a hardware embodiment. If we mean to exclude meth-
ods of doing, business from the regime of patents, then we should
also reject claims reciting computerized methods where the - only
patentable teaching lies in the realm of business rather than tech-
nology. To do otherwise is to exalt form over substance, an argu-
ment that has been made extensively elsewhere. 2°°
The United States Patent Office recently issued Software Guide-
lines that appear to urge similar restilts. The Guidelines recognize that
because "[t] here is always some form of physical transformation within
a computer because a computer acts on signals and transforms them
during its operation and changes the state of its components during
the execution of a process," such activity alone is not determinative. 296
The Guidelines instead provide that the "utility of an invention must
be within the 'technological' arts" for it to be patentable, pointing to
the familiar requirements of physical transformation and practical
application.29' Based on this and other text within the Guidelines, at
least one commentator concluded that the Guidelines would render
most computer-implemented business methods unpatentable. 2"
The Patent Office Deputy Commissioner, however, took a differ-
ent position and fOund the Federal Circuit's State Street opinion to have
"ratified the validity of the approach taken" in the Guidelines. 299 Given
the "Delphic" character of the Guidelines"° and their inability to dic-
29-1 _M. at 12.
"5 See generally Stern, supra note 78. See also Richard H. Stern, Solving the Algorithm Conun-
drum: After 1994 In the Federal Circuit Patent Law Needs a Radical Algolithmectomy, 22 AM. INTELI,.
PROR. L. Ass'N Q,J. 167 (1994).
296 Software Guidelines, supra note 208, at 7484.
207 See id. at 7479.
200 See Del Gallo, supra note 50, at 425-27.
2}1) Sec generally Oberilorler, supra note 10.
'mu See Richard II. Stern, On Defining the Concept of Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights
in Algorithms and Other Abstract Computer-Related Ideas, 23 Mn. 'WELL. PROP, L. ASS'N QJ. 401,
408 n.17 (1995).
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tate examiner decisions, 301 overreliance on the Guidelines seems inap-
propriate. The fact remains that the Patent Office has experienced a
"boom" in applications claiming business methods and, following State
Street, appears obliged to allow them to mature into allowed patents." 2
• A legislative approach appears the best possibility for reminding
the patent system that not everything we do is technological. Congress
would do well to import the requirement of industrial applicability
into United States patent law. This touchstone not only parallels much
of the teachings of contemporary thought concerning technology, it
would provide a proven criterion that already affects the majority of
the world's issued patents. Not only does the TRIPS Agreement ex-
pressly allow signatories to impose this requirement, 303 its adoption
would move the United States further in the direction of global patent
harmonization. 304
Of course, no claim can be made that industrial application would
offer a panacea for our 'patent eligibility ills. The European Patent
Office has arguably drifted from the reasoning of Merrill Lynch in a
handful of recent opinions involving computer-implemented meth- .
ods."5
 Slinilarly, the Japanese Patent Office seems' favorably disposed
towards the patenting of known computer hardware that does no more
than process data in a novel way. 306
 But adoption of the industrial
application standard here would render the current patentability de-
3° 1 See Software Guidelines, supra note 208, at 7479 ("These Guidelines do not constitute
substantive rnlentaking and hence do not have the force and effect of law.").
"2
 See generally Oberdorfer, 'supra note 10.
363 .5ee TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 27(1).
3°4 See HAROLD C. WEGNER, PATEN'I' HARMONIZATION § 2300 (1993) ([toting efforts to LIU-
immize the definition of patentable subject matter via international agreement).
s05 In particular see the controversial decision SOHEI, Decision T 769/92 (1994) ("General-
purpose management system"), reprinted in CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF PATENT AGENTS, EUROPEAN
PATErrrs HANDIroox (2d ed. 1990). The lengthy claims at issue before the European Patent Office
Board of Appeal defined computer hardware, data storage files and a plurality of processing
means for controlling the hardware mid for storing, updating, reading and outputting the data.
The patent application described the system as useful fur financial and inventory management,
mid in particular construction management. Thus, the system might, for example, track the work
to be done on a particular site within the construction industry.
According to the Board, the claimed invention involved technical considerations because it
involved a novel use of different files to cause the computer to perform different tasks. Moreover,
die Board noted that ntanagement;of construction sites was comparable to the management of
traditional manufacturing processeS. The claimed invention could therefore nor he considered
a method of doing business excluded from patentability by the European Patent Convention.
Although arguably quite a different case than Merrill Lyon's, the reasoning of the SOHEI Board
offers ample possibilities for artful claims drafters to overcome the restrictions upon patentable
subject matter within the European Patent Convention.
306 See jP0 GUIDELINES, MOM note 280, § 2.2.1, (c)-2 (iii) (section entitled Implementing
guidelines for inventions in specific fields: Computer Software Related Inventions").
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bate a far more sober one. Rather than remain paralyzed by the
complex issues surrounding the patentability of computer-related in-
ventions, we should recognize that a broader movement is afoot. The
stewards of our patent system ought to consider informed responses
to our increasingly ambitious scope of patenting, rather than rely upon
the patent bar to stage an informed debate on the appropriate vision
of patentable subject matter.
CONCLUSION
Each issue of the Patent Office Gazette seems to include proprietary
processes from an unlikely collection of disciplines. Although we once
might have relegated these claims to some popular compilation of
unusual patents,"7 the Federal Circuit opinion in State Street has im-
bued them with newfound vitality. With the Patent Office open for
patents on business methods, the frontiers of the patent system appear
virtually without limit. The patent system now seems poised to impact
callings ranging from the arts, to the social sciences, to the law itself.
There is much to commend the adoption of the standard of
industrial application in the United States patent law. Our patent law
should comport with our perception of what technology is, not defy it.
Restoring a patentability standard firmly grounded in industrial appli-
cability, rather than equating technology with anything artificial, would
enable us to maintain the integrity of our current patent system.
Moreover, it would enable us to respect the boundary between the
whole expression of our humanity and that small part of it that is
properly called technological."8 However central to contemporary life
and worthy of nurturing through the patent system, technology is but
one manifestation of the human experience.
" See, e.g„ RICK FEINBERG, PECULIAR PATENTS: A COLLECTION OF UNUSUAL AND INTEREST-
ING INVENTIONS FROM THE Fit.Es e.R 'IHIE U.S., PATENT OFFICE (1904).
"The writings of Martin lleidegger suggest this concern. See Martin Heidegger, The Ques-
that Concerning li ,thnology, ia BASIC WRITINGS, 017, 308 (David Farrell Krell ed., 1977) ("A.s soon
as what is unconcealed no longer concert IS mail even as object, b u t exclusively as standing-reserve,
and man in die midst or oldectIcssoess is nothing brit the orderer of the standing-reserve, then
he conies to the very brink of a precipitous fall, that is, he collies to the point where lie himself
will have to lie taken as slanding-reserve."); MARIAN HEIDEGGER, DISCOURSE ON THINKING 56
(John M. Andersc.M K F.. l•Ualls Freund t rans., 1966) ("1T)he approaching tide of technological
revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle, mid beguile into that calculative
thinking may someday conic lo be accepted and practiced as the only way or thinking.").
